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ABSTRACT
Narrative Comprehension for Functional Survival Spatial Relations
by
Paul James Schroeder, III
Dr. David E. Copeland, Examination Committee Chair
Assistant Professor of Psychology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Spatial situation models are mental representations of the relationship between characters
and objects in the narrative environment. Functional spatial relationships describe an
interaction (or potential interaction) between characters and objects in the narrative
environment. Although functional relations tend to produce stronger representations as
compared with nonfunctional ones (Radvansky & Copeland, 2000), recent data also
suggest that specification of causal information, specifically, survival-based scenarios in
which characters are described as in immediate danger, may contribute to the
construction and maintenance of spatial situation models (Jahn, 2004). For the current
study, this idea was tested by comparing reading times and comprehension for narrative
texts that describe characters in either dangerous or neutral scenarios who are interacting
with objects in either a functional or nonfunctional manner. Although faster reading times
and better recognition scores were observed for the functional critical sentences as
compared with nonfunctional critical sentences, dangerous/survival scenarios did not
enhance memory, but actually led to poorer memory. These results suggest that readers’
ability to comprehend spatial relationships depend more on the functionality of the
objects in the narrative environment than the survival status of the character, but that
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survival does contribute to readers subsequent memorial reconstruction of details
described in the text.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Interactions between characters and objects in the environment are better
comprehended when a functional relationship exists between story entities, as compared
with nonfunctional relationships (Radvansky & Copeland, 2000; Radvansky, Copeland,
& Zwaan, 2003). For example, readers better remember that a character was under a
streetlight on a dark night if she was reading a map, as opposed to if she was trying to get
out of the rain.
The present experiment examined comprehension for functional and
nonfunctional spatial relations when characters were described as being in survival or
non-survival situations. Participants read twenty original narratives, half containing
context making the scenario dangerous (i.e., survival condition) and half with a neutral
scenario (i.e., non-survival condition). Of those scenarios, half of each condition had a
functional and half had a nonfunctional critical sentence. For example, a character may
be seeking protection from a predatory animal (survival condition) or taking photos of a
non-threatening animal (non-survival condition) and is subsequently described as
standing behind (functional) or in front of a large tree (nonfunctional). In this example,
standing behind the tree would be functional because the protagonist is either seeking
protection from a predator (survival scenario) or trying not to startle the harmless animal
(non-survival scenario). Conversely, standing in front of the tree would be nonfunctional
because the protagonist would be seen by the predator (survival scenario) or would startle
the harmless animal (non-survival). Critical sentence reading times were recorded. After
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reading all of the narratives, participants were then asked to identify the critical
functional/nonfunctional sentence in a forced-choice recognition paradigm.
Inclusion of the critical survival context was expected to facilitate readers’
attention to the critical functional/nonfunctional relation (Jahn, 2004). More precisely,
comprehension of functional spatial relations could be enhanced by the presence of a
threat. Additional support for this prediction comes from recent interest in the “adaptive
memory hypothesis” (Nairne, Pandeirada, & Thompson, 2008; Nairne, Thompson, &
Panderirada, 2007), which proposes that the human cognitive system is attuned to
survival-relevant information.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Text Comprehension
The construction-integration model of text comprehension (Kintsch & van Dijk,
1978; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) posits that successful comprehension of narrative text
requires a series of cognitive operations on the part of the reader. Primary among these
operations is the act of absorbing the items from the text (i.e., letters, words, sentences,
and discourse) into the reader’s cognitive architecture. Naturally, these operations depend
on the presentation modality, be it visual or auditory. Following brief storage in sensory
memory, the symbolic contents of the text are then passed on to the short-term working
memory system where they are synthesized into meaningful representations and
subsequently combined with general world and linguistic knowledge stored in long term
memory (Erricson & Kintsch, 1995). At a minimum, the culmination of these steps ought
to result in a coherent semantic or conceptual understanding of what is being read.
It is generally agreed among psycholinguists that the mental representation of text
assumes three distinct, but interdependent levels: (1) the surface form, (2) the
propositional textbase, and (3) the situation model (e.g. van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). The
surface form is the most basic level of representation and refers to the text itself, such as
the sentences, phrases, or words that are used. Conceptual and semantic information
contribute to the propositional textbase representations. That is, the textbase refers to the
ideas that are in the text, but not necessarily to the exact words used. Finally,
representations of the state-of-affairs described in a given text are commonly referred to
as situation models (Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan &
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Radvansky, 1998). Situation models include a combination of what is being described in
the text as well as what is inferred from the text. On the one hand, situation models of
narrative text may contain perceptual information, such as images, of scenes described in
a text. On the other hand, they may represent technical information, for example the
linguistic and mathematical contents of a word problem (Kintsch & Greeno, 1985). Thus,
situation models are not static entities; the representation maintained in a situation model
depends on, among other things, the nature of the text itself.
According to van Dijk and Kintsch (1983; and summarized in Zwaan &
Radvansky, 1998), situation models serve multiple purposes in the reading
comprehension process. First, situation models help facilitate the incorporation of items
discussed in a text. This may be accomplished, for instance, by creating tokens of
characters or spatial locations of events portrayed in a text. Second, situation models may
be useful in integrating modality-specific information in the cognitive architecture. For
example, consumers of news information may exploit both textual and pictorial
accompaniments in a given feature to form a coherent representation of an event. Third,
greater familiarity with the topic under consideration permits stronger representations
which ultimately yields faster and greater comprehension. Military personnel would
likely navigate a field manual with greater dexterity and acumen as compared with a
civilian simply because the military person possesses familiarity (or prior knowledge)
with the information in the manual and therefore expends less cognitive effort in
comprehending the material (assuming that both readers had comparable reading skills).
Finally, situation models help readers make sense of competing sources of information.
Suppose two workers are telling their boss about an event that she missed. The boss may
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use information from both workers to construct one coherent mental representation of the
event.
Although the need for situation models is nearly universal in most reading
contexts, there are occasions when situation models are not required or even necessary,
such as proofreading. When proofreading, the reader’s goal is not to understand the deep
meaning of the text; instead, the reader is solely concerned with monitoring surface
information (i.e., the text itself) for errors, such as misspelled words or poor grammar.
Because proofreaders do not construct situation models, it can be inferred that the
construction of one is not necessarily an automatic process. However, it should be noted,
that under most reading conditions, it is useful to construct a situation model, and hence,
people do this.
Zwaan and associates (Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky,
1998) break down the situation model process into three general steps. First, readers
create a current model (tn) for a certain clause or sentence (cn). Second, as the reader
progresses in the text, new clauses and sentences (c1 through cn) are added to the current
model which results in the creation of an integrated model (t1 through tn). The transition
process from the current model to the integrated model is commonly referred to as
updating (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Once the reader has reached the conclusion of a
passage, a complete model (t1 through tx) is created which represents the culmination of
each current and integrated model. Whereas information pertinent to the current and
integrated models likely resides in working memory, information comprising the
complete model is contained in long term memory.
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As implied earlier, events- particularly singular events - play an important role in
the construction and maintenance of situation models. According to Zwaan (1999) the
interpretation of an event requires the activation of both semantic and episodic
knowledge. For example, the experience and act of talking may facilitate a reader’s
ability to follow a story line. This assumption is consistent with van Dijk and Kintsch’s
(1983) proposal that successful comprehension requires drawing on long term memory
resources.
These ideas suggest that comprehension depends on readers’ ability to draw
inferences and the readers’ knowledge about the world (Haberlandt, 1994).
Operationally stated, the term inference “refers to information that is activated during
reading yet not explicitly stated in the text” (Van den Broek, 1994, p.556). Despite a
relatively long tradition of research dating back to the work of Bartlett in the 1930’s,
inferences, what they are and how precisely they may facilitate reading, has been a
frequent source of controversy among researchers (Van den Broek, 1994; Graesser,
Singer, & Trabasso, 1994). Guthke (1991; see also Kintsch, 1993) hypothesized that
inferences draw on information held in long-term memory or on newly acquired
information and this process may result from either automatic or controlled processing. In
automatic processing, the reader immediately recognizes an item in a text and links the
new information with older information in long-term memory. Controlled processing,
however, occurs when a reader is unable to progress in a text without making an
inference or when the reader has a special goal to achieve. The reader must, therefore, try
to access information in memory to make the necessary connection (but see McKoon &
Ratcliff, 1992).
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The Event-Indexing Model and Situation Dimensions
Congruent with the construction-integration theory of text comprehension, Zwaan
and colleagues have developed the event-indexing-model (Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser,
1995; Zwann & Radvansky, 1998) which specifies how situation models are created,
updated, and used during comprehension. The model proposes that during reading an
individual may decompose text information into events which are temporarily sustained
in working memory. Connections between subsequently encountered elements that are
relevant with the events in working memory are formed and stored in long-term memory.
Associations between previously and newly encountered text elements span five general
dimensions (or indices): (1) protagonist, (2) goals/intentions, (3) time, (4) causation, and
(5) space. Because situation models are based on these dimensions, a discussion of each
of these factors follows below. The final dimension to be discussed, space, is the focus of
the current paper.
The protagonist
In a typical narrative, the protagonist can essentially be the focus, or like a guide,
in the development and maintenance of situation models. Indeed, Scott Rich and Taylor
(2000) argue that characters are critical to maintaining a situation model of narrative text.
This section contains a description of studies that have examined how readers form a
coherent representation of a protagonist within the structure of a larger text.
The situation model perspective concerning the role of the protagonist is largely
inspired by the work of Sanford and Garrod (1981; see also Garrod & Sanford, 1998).
The focus model and its related research provides an extensive account of the cognitive
processes involved in reading and comprehending information pertaining to characters in

7

narrative text. The model assumes, as do theories of discourse comprehension, that
readers’ ability to comprehend narrative text is constrained by the limited capacity of a
working memory system and the rules of linguistics. Because stories typically describe an
evolving series of events, readers are required to retain and combine previously learned
information with evolving details and events that occur within a story. Concurrently,
readers must also rely on explicitly stated information about the protagonist to
comprehend implicitly stated information about other events or characters.
Therefore, it stands to reason that the main character (or “thematic subject”) in a
narrative serves as a point of reference for readers to attune their attention. Ancillary or
secondary characters may also serve as points of reference in a story, but readers are
typically more concerned with the events occurring to and around the main character.
Character details, such as when and how a character is introduced in a story (i.e., proper
name vs. role), can clue readers into the extent of a character’s relevance (Anderson,
Garrod, & Sanford, 1983; Morrow, 1985; Sanford, Moar, & Garrod, 1988). Sanford,
Moar, and Garrod (1988) tested the effect of proper names (e.g., Mr. Bloggs) versus role
references (e.g., the manager) in a narrative context. They reported that reading times for
stories that introduced characters by name was shorter than reading times for stories that
introduced characters by their roles. This is consistent with the idea that readers have
primary representations of characters (e.g., based on their names) and that properties
(e.g., role) are associated with them, but are not the focus in a mental model. These
results therefore appear to be consistent with the specifications of the focus model
concerning the importance of proper names in identifying the main character in a story.
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There is also evidence that people actively monitor the introduction of new
characters when reading narratives. For example, reading times tend to slow when a new
character is introduced, suggesting that people are incorporating that new character into
their situation model (Zwaan, Magliano, & Graesser, 1995). Along this line, the frequent
recurrence of proper names in narratives, particularly when ancillary characters are
involved, may also have an inhibitory effect. For example, Gordon and Scearce (1995)
reported that when participants read short narratives (such as the one below), shorter
reading times were observed for sentence (1a) if it contained a pronominal referent to the
preceding sentences, whereas reading times for sentence (1b) were shorter if they
contained a repeated name.
Bill wanted John to look over some important papers.
He had to mail him the documents by Monday.
(1a) Unfortunately, he/Bill never sent the papers. [continue]
(1b) Unfortunately, he/John never received the papers. [shift]
As a result, the whole deal fell behind schedule.
These findings suggest foremost that readers do indeed monitor and are responsive to the
introduction of new characters. That is, the presence of a proper name signals that the
character should be included in the readers’ current situation model. Updating the current
situation model with new information requires greater processing resources and, as a
result, slows reading times. Moreover, these results suggest that the assimilation between
the current and integrated situation models is contingent on both surface and
propositional details.
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Investigations of protagonist characteristics have also yielded evidence for
situation model construction and updating. Some research indicates that readers are
attentive to changes in a character’s affective state (de Vega, León, & Diáz, 1996;
Gernsbacher, Hallada, & Robertson, 1998; Komeda & Kusumi, 2006). Decelerations in
participant reading times have been recorded for emotional shifts (Komeda & Kusumi,
2006) and inconsistencies (de Vega, et al., 1996) during narrative reading. Researchers
have interpreted these outcomes as suggestive of online updating of situation model
construction (Komeda & Kusumi, 2006; Zwaan & Radvanky, 1998); specifically, an
updating of the characteristics of the protagonists.
In sum, these studies provide evidence suggesting that readers keep track of, and
recall information about, characters during narrative reading. This is because readers
focus their attention on protagonists during narrative reading (Sanford & Garrod, 1981).
Readers rely on explicitly stated details, such as proper names, to determine a character’s
relevance to a story (Anderson, Garrod, & Sanford, 1983; Morrow, 1985; Sanford, Moar,
& Garrod, 1988). Finally, the repeated finding that changes in characters’ emotional
states during narratives elicits changes in participants’ reading times has been interpreted
as evidence for online situation model maintenance and updating (de Vega, León, &
Diáz, 1996; Gernsbacher, Hallada, & Robertson, 1998; Komeda & Kusumi, 2006; Zwaan
& Radvansky, 1998).
Goals/intentionality
In Shakespeare’s Hamlet, the protagonist endures a series of trials and
tribulations, including feigning insanity and serving jail time, in order to accomplish the
ultimate goal of avenging his father’s murder. His quest begins when a ghost informs
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him that his father’s untimely death was perpetrated by his uncle, Claudius. Despite his
skepticism about the ghost’s advice, he decides to take up the cause. Had the meeting
between the hero and the ghost not occurred at the outset of the story many of the
subsequent details would make little sense. For example, because he suspects that his
uncle is guilty, Hamlet pays close attention to Claudius’s actions during a play depicting
his father’s death. In any other context, this behavior might seem unusual. Thus, an
understanding of the primary character’s motivation is critical for successful
comprehension.
This notion is consistent with the constructionist framework of narrative
comprehension (Graesser, Singer, & Trabsso, 1994). The constructionist perspective
stipulates that readers actively engage in a search for meaning during reading. More
specifically, rather than focusing their attention on surface level details (i.e., letters and
words; the structure of sentences), readers are more concerned with making sense of what
they are reading. A crucial part of this process includes determining why characters
behave as they do in a narrative. Characters’ actions are often inspired by accomplishing
some ultimate (superordinate) goal; but before that goal may be met, the individual may
have to overcome a series of smaller (subordinate) goals. For example, Hamlet’s
superordinate goal is to avenge his father’s death; yet, to accomplish this he must
overcome a sequence of interim obstacles, or subordinate goals, created by Claudius.
Forming associations between the superordinate goals of characters, subsequent actions,
and the overall theme of a story requires readers to generate inferences (Graesser, et al.,
1994) because some of the vital information may not be explicitly stated in the text.
These inferences are likely created during on-line reading (Long, Golding, & Graesser,
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1992; for an alternative perspective, see McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992), provided that the text
is coherent and that the reader has followed the story through its natural course.
Much of the research on the role of intentionality in narrative comprehension has
focused on the relationship between actions and goals. The accumulated evidence
suggests that readers create a mental checklist of goal-relevant story details. Goals that
have been satisfied are essentially checked-off and mentally discarded, whereas
unsatisfied goals remain prominent in memory. Character actions are therefore evaluated
in terms of their relevance to the most pressing goal. Suh and Trabasso (1993, see also
Trabasso & Suh, 1993) used verbal protocols and text probes to measure participants’
comprehension of stories in which primary and secondary goals were met or unmet.
Results from the verbal protocols suggested that participants were more focused on
unsatisfied subgoals, as compared with unsatisfied superordinate goals. Analysis of
reading times for the probes indicated that participants read information about unsatisfied
goals faster than probes for satisfied goals.
Explanations for why unsatisfied goal information is more accessible to readers
than satisfied goal information has eluded researchers; yet the effect has been replicated
on numerous occasions (i.e., Lutz & Radvansky, 1997; Magliano & Radvansky, 2001;
Radvansky & Curiel, 1998; Richards & Singer, 2001). One possibility is that the level of
agreement between goals and actions may have some effect on comprehension (Egidi &
Gerrig, 2006; Huitema, Dopkins, Klin, & Meyers 1993). Huitema, et al (1993) found that
reading times for stories vary as a function of consistency between goals and actions.
Uncompleted goals can be a potential motivator of actions, whereas completed goals
cannot (provided that the completion does not yield a new uncompleted goal) (Suh &
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Trabasso, 1993; Trabasso & Suh, 1993). This is because readers of narratives understand
that characters actions are typically inspired by a quest to accomplish some goal.
Therefore, comprehension is best achieved when there is congruency between events that
occur within a narrative and the motivations of the character. That is, characters actions
are causally relevant to the characters goals (Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985).
In conclusion, information about goals is important for narrative comprehension
because readers make sense of events that transpire during the course of a narrative by
following the goals of the characters (Graesser, Singer, & Trabsso, 1994) whether they
are superordinate or subordinate goals. When a text fails to clarify the relationship
between a characters’ described behavior and the meeting of a goal, readers generate
inferences (Graesser, et al., 1994). When there is strong agreement between characters’
actions and goals, readers are better able to comprehend what they are reading (Egidi &
Gerrig, 2006; Huitema, Dopkins, Klin, & Meyers 1993). Finally, goals-in-progress are
more easily activated than unmet goals, possibly because unmet goals provide motivation
for a character’s actions (Suh & Trabasso, 1993; Trabasso & Suh, 1993).
Time
Of critical importance to the successful comprehension of narrative texts is the
reader’s ability to follow the duration of an unfolding sequence of events (Anderson,
Garrod, & Sanford, 1983; Mandler, 1984; Ohtsuka & Brewer, 1992). Studies have shown
that common linguistic devices, such as verb tense (was, will, am), time adverbs (i.e.
before, after, now), and verb aspect (ate, was eating) function as temporal markers to
signal the order in which events occur (Carreiras, Carriedo, Alonso, & Fernández, 1997;
Magliano & Schleich, 2000, Zwaan, 1996). Readers rely on these textual cues, in addition
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to general world knowledge, to form a coherent mental representation of what is being
described in the text, but are limited by the amount of information they are able to
process and store in working memory (Magliano & Schleich, 2000; Ohtsuka & Brewer,
1992).
Occasionally, the temporal order of events may not be specified in a given text, as
demonstrated in the following sentence:
(2) Riley went to the kitchen, picked up the pineapple, and grabbed a knife.
When a narrative text fails to explicitly state the order of events via tense or adverbs,
readers take for granted that the narrated sequence (i.e. Riley first went to the kitchen/
picked up the pineapple when he got there/ then grabbed the knife) is the correct order of
events. The iconicity assumption (Fleischman, 1990; Hopper, 1979) states that, in the
absence of clear temporal guidelines, readers generally assume that the order in which
events in a story are told denotes the correct chronological order.
Dowty (1986; see also Zwaan, 1996) proposed an extended version of the
iconicity assumption, the so-called “strong iconicity assumption” (or temporal discourse
interpretation principle), which specifies that, in addition to relying on the order in which
events are relayed in a story, extended time lapses within the duration of a narrative may
prompt readers to create a new situation model. For example, narratives can include
sudden leaps in time, flashbacks, or flashforwards, which could disrupt comprehension.
Zwaan, Magliano, and Graesser (1995) reported that increases in sentence reading times
were observed when readers encountered temporal discontinuities in narratives,
regardless of whether readers were engaged in natural reading or reading for memory.
Zwaan, Radvansky, Hilliard, and Curiel (1998) also found the same effect for temporal
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discontinuities when stories were presented clause-by-clause, rather than sentence-bysentence, as in Zwaan, et al’s (1995) study. In addition, using an event related potential
(ERP) method, Ditman, Holcomb, and Kuperberg (2008) showed that noticeable N400 (a
negative electric brainwave that occurs 400 milliseconds after the presentation of a
stimulus) patterns occurred when readers encountered large, unexpected time shifts, as
compared with short or moderate time shifts. The N400 pattern suggests that readers
spent more time reading the longer narrative time shifts and, thus, integrating the
information into their situation model.
Additional empirical support for the strong iconicity assumption comes from
Zwaan (1996). Participants were exposed to short narratives in which the critical
sentences featured either close (i.e., a moment later), intermediate (i.e., an hour later), or
distant (i.e., a day later) temporal adverbials. Consistent with the strong iconicity
assumption, shorter reading times and response latencies were found for stories in which
there was a shorter time shift (i.e., a moment later). It appears as though larger time shifts
(i.e., a day later) suggest to readers that they should construct a new situation model
because the narrative is likely to now be describing a new state-of-affairs. That is, this
suggests that temporal discontinuities in the story timeline may interfere with the normal
maintenance of a prior situation model. When a reader encounters a narrative time shift,
information that was read prior to the shift may become less accessible because it is part
of the earlier situation model, while newer information becomes more prominent in
memory, because it is part of the current situation model (Speer & Zacks, 2005).
Radvansky, Zwaan, Federico, and Franklin (1998) extended the findings of
Zwaan (1996) by demonstrating that, regardless of whether the necessary temporal
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linguistic information (i.e., temporal adverbials, verb tense) is available from a text, when
readers encounter inconsistent information, the current situation model may become
discarded for a new one to complete the integrated model. For instance, provided that a
character is not a two-headed, four-limbed being, most readers would immediately
recognize the physical impossibility of an average human character simultaneously
playing pinball, reading a novel, and playing piano. If one were to have read these facts
during the course of a normal narrative, the conflicting new information would likely
disrupt the normal updating process and interfere with any associated recall activity.
However, if the text specifies that a character contemplated reading a novel while they
were playing pinball or thought about playing a piano while they were reading but did
not actually perform these activities simultaneously (as indicated by the requisite
adverbials), then normal comprehension would not be disrupted (de Vega, Robertson,
Glenberg, Kaschak, & Rinck, 2004).
The use of other inconsistency paradigms has also revealed evidence that readers
use temporal information to update their situation model. One approach has been to
manipulate temporal information so that it is inconsistent with subsequent information
(Rink, Gámez, Diáz, & de Vega, 2003; Rink, Hähnel, & Becker, 2001). Another
approach has been to manipulate temporal information in such a way that it violates
readers’ expectations. Therriault and Raney (2007) compared reading times for narratives
comprised of events that occurred over normal or incongruent temporal durations. For
example, in one passage two characters met at a restaurant and dined together for either
one-hour (normal duration), seven hours (long-inconsistent duration), or five minutes
(short-inconsistent duration). As with other inconsistency studies, the manipulation had a
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significant effect on reading times. In general, the detection of these inconsistencies
shows that people actively monitor temporal information (Therriault & Raney, 2007).
Together, these studies show that temporal situation models depend on
comprehension of text-level input as well as inferences derived from the readers’ world
knowledge. Specificity about the duration of events that occur during the course of a
narrative facilitates comprehension, whereas textural inconsistencies and sudden time
shifts may disrupt comprehension (Zwaan, et al., 1995; Zwaan, et al., 1998). When the
duration of events is not specified in the text, readers defer to the narrated sequence, as
described by the iconicity assumption (Dowty, 1986; Fleischman, 1990; Hopper, 1979;
Zwaan, 1996).
Causation
A cohesive narrative must account for why characters behave in a described
manner or why certain events happen so that a person can comprehend what they are
reading. Comprehending causal relations requires both textual cues as well as inferences
derived from the reader’s world knowledge. The following section provides a bottom-up
description of how readers create causal representations of narratives. First, consideration
will be given to how the integration of sentence-level information, including the use of
specific grammatical devices (connectives), forms a basic causal description of the text.
A brief discussion will follow on the role of inferences derived from the text and world
knowledge in generating higher-level representations of a narrative. The section will
conclude with a short discussion about theories of higher-level representations of causal
coherence.
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Inspired by the work of Haliday and Hasan (1976), researchers began to explore
how text-based cues (such as conjunctions) help readers comprehend narrative relations.
Conjunctives (connectives) are grammatical devices (words, phrases) used to specify
conceptually associated statements or clauses in text. There are four major types of
conjunctions: (1) additive (and, also), (2) adversative (however, but), (3) causal (as a
result, because), and (4) temporal (after, then). It is generally agreed among researchers
that, because they reduce the linguistic ambiguity between clauses or statements in a text
and therefore the need for inferences, connectives are helpful for reading comprehension
(Haliday & Hasan, 1976; Haviland & Clark, 1974; Keenan & Kintsch, 1974; Lorch,
1989).
There are several lines of evidence suggestive of the facilitative effect of
connectives, more specifically causal connectives, on reading comprehension. First,
faster reading times have been observed for sentences containing causal connectives as
compared with no connectives (Haberlant, 1982; Millis & Just, 1994), additive
connectives (Sanders, 1992; Sanders & Noordman; 1998), temporal connectives (Singer,
Halldorson, Lear, & Andrusiak, 1992), and diagnostic sentences (Traxler, Bybee, &
Pickering, 1997). It has also been demonstrated that the presence of causal connectives
promoted superior performance on other cognitive activities such as recall (Caron,
Micko, & Thüring, 1988; Golding, Millis, Hauselt, & Sego, 1995; Millis, Golding, &
Barker, 1995; Millis & Just, 1994; Sanders, 1992; Sanders & Noordman, 1998),
verification latencies (Cozijn, 1992; Sanders, 1992; Sanders & Noordman, 1998); and
probe response times (Cozijn, 1992; Millis & Just, 1994; Singer, et al., 1992).
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Some scientists contend that causal connectives facilitate comprehension by
enabling readers to make connections between sentence-level clauses. Millis and Just
(1994) proposed a connective integration model of text processing, which stipulates that
readers create separate representations for two clauses, each of which is held briefly in a
limited capacity working memory system and subsequently combined when the end of a
sentence is reached. For example, when readers encounter a sentence like “The elderly
parents toasted their only daughter at the party because Jill had passed the exams at the
prestigious university” a representation is created for the first clause in working memory,
while the connective (because) signals the creation of an additional representation for the
second clause. Upon reaching the end of the sentence, a unified, integrated representation
is then created for both clauses and the reader is thus able to understand how these two
pieces of information go together. Data from eye-tracking studies suggests that clause
integration may occur prior to sentence wrap-up (Traxler, Bybee, & Pickering, 1997).
In addition to text-level information, people also rely on world knowledge to
determine causal relations during reading. Investigations into the role of world
knowledge in comprehension have been conducted by examining participants’ abilities to
generate inferences for causal information (Zwaan & Singer, 2003). For example, Black
and Bern (1981) presented short stories to participants in which the first sentence was
either causally or temporally related to the next sentence. In the following example,
readers must infer that the protagonist is sad (4) either because he lost his pocketknife
(3a) or for some reason not specified in the text (3b).
(3a) Causal: While he was sitting on a huge log he lost an old pocketknife.
(3b) Temporal: While he was sitting on a huge log he found an old pocketknife.
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(4) He felt sad as they took a few more pictures and headed back.
Results from both cued and free recall tests indicated that causally related stories were
better recalled than temporally related stories. Thus, when an explicit expression of the
causal relation between story elements is available to readers, comprehension improves.
One explanation for this finding is that in the absence of an explicit causal
description, readers use bridging inferences to make associations between sentences
(Singer, Halldorson, Lear, & Andrusiak, 1992; Singer, Revlin, & Halldorson, 1990).
Bridging inferences require that readers validate a given premise (i.e., Dorothy poured
water on the fire. The fire went out.) with their knowledge of the world (i.e., water
extinguishes fire). As the distance between idea units increases (i.e., Dorothy poured
gasoline on the fire. The fire went out.), the greater the strain on working memory
resources and, consequently, comprehension becomes disrupted (Singer, Halldorson,
Lear, & Andrusiak, 1992; Zwaan & Singer, 2003).
Text-level comprehension and inferences generated from world knowledge
ultimately aid in the creation of a cohesive representation of a narrative. Theoretical
accounts of the nature of these representations derive largely from the constructionist
tradition, which holds that readers are actively engaged in a “search for meaning” during
reading and that attentive readers are motivated to understand what they are reading
(Graesser, Singer, & Trabsso, 1994). Network models of reading, such as those
developed by Trabasso and colleagues (Trabasso, Secco, & van den Broek, 1984;
Trabasso & Sperry, 1985; Trabasso & Suh, 1993; Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985) are
useful in helping researchers illustrate how readers mentally represent causal relations.
Fundamentally, the model developed by Trabasso and colleagues specifies that the goals
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of the protagonist generate a sequence of causally related events (a “causal chain”) that
occur throughout the course of a story. The strength of the connections between events
facilitates or inhibits the readers understanding of the narrative. As such, deviations from
the specified goals of the protagonist will disrupt the formation of a coherent causal
representation of the story. Evidence obtained from recall measures suggests that stories
with strong causal chains were better recalled than stories with weak causal chains
(Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985).
In sum, the formation of a causal situation model of a narrative requires both
lower- and higher- level processing. At the lower level, readers must form coherent
sentence level representations. Sentence representations are facilitated by textual cues,
namely, causal connectives (Haliday and Hasan, 1976), and depend critically on the
availability and amount of information that can be stored in working memory (Millis &
Just, 1994). Texts that specify causal relationships are better remembered than texts that
require the readers to generate bridging inferences (Singer, et al., 1992; Singer, et al.
1990). Textual information, inferences, and world knowledge contribute to the
maintenance and updating of higher-level causal representations (Trabasso, et al., 1984;
Trabasso & Sperry, 1985; Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985).
Space
Thus far, this paper has presented a survey of four of the five dimensions central
to situation model construction and maintenance: the protagonist, goals/intentionality,
time, and causality. The spatial dimension is the primary focus of the study. This section
will first consider research related to the spatial framework and will then examine spatial
relations.
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Space is one of the most widely researched dimensions of situation models
(Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Efforts to understand spatial situation models have
generally sought to determine how readers use spatial situation models and how they
might interact with other situational variables. For example, one area of interest is how
readers monitor the movements and actions of the protagonist in certain environments.
Here, consideration will be given to evidence for the organization and monitoring of
spatial information and how readers continuously update this information into a coherent
situation model.
The idea that people use space as a foundation for their mental models was
demonstrated by Radvansky and colleagues (Gerard, Zacks, Hasher, & Radvansky, 1991;
Radvansky, 1999a; Radvansky, Spieler, & Zacks, 1993; Radvansky & Zacks, 1991;
Radvansky, Zacks, & Hasher, 1996) in that they showed that readers organize spatial
information by creating single or multiple spatial situation models from textual content.
In these studies participants read sentences that described randomly paired objects and
locations, or characters and locations. A typical set of sentences might be:
(5) The cola machine is in the hotel.

The cola machine is in the public library.

(6) The cola machine is in the high school.
(7) The display case is in the city hall.
(8) The potted palm is in the city hall.
(9) The broken window is in the city hall.
Thus, in this example one object (the cola machine) is described as being in three
spatially distinct locations (the hotel, the public library, and the school). These sentences
also describe a single location (city hall) that contains multiple objects (the display case,
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potted palm, and broken window). The primary findings for these studies were that
participants exhibited better recall for information about multiple objects in a single
location. For example, the participants appeared to integrate that the city hall contained
the display case, potted palm, and the broken window better than the fact that the cola
machine was located in the hotel, the public library, and the high school. The latter
finding is commonly referred to as the fan effect. One explanation for these outcomes is
that the logical impossibility of a single object being simultaneously present in three
different locations disrupted comprehension or caused processing difficulties. However,
the situation model perspective for these findings is that readers create an integrated
spatio-temporal representation for related pieces of information and separate
representations for unrelated pieces of information. In other words, people seemed to be
building situation models centered around spatial locations. By merging related
information (i.e., common location) into a unified representation, readers were better able
to access pertinent information and suppress irrelevant information during recall
(Radvansky, 1999b; for an alternative memory-based perspective, see Anderson & Reder,
1999).
While spatial location seems to be a primary basis of organizing information,
sometimes this is not a realistic option. For example, it is possible for a spatial location to
be too small to realistically contain multiple objects or people (e.g., a witness stand in
court or a bathroom on a Greyhound bus). Radvansky, Spieler, and Zacks (1993) showed
that when spatial organization is not plausible, people will sometimes organize around a
protagonist. That is, in this scenario readers exhibited better recall for information about a
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single character in multiple locations. However, this does seem to be an exception to the
typical pattern of organizing around spatial locations.
The above point is important because even though people typically organize
situation models around spatial locations, spatial and entity information can interact. For
example, readers seem to monitor protagonists as they move through various locations.
As discussed previously, readers are sensitive to narrative details about a protagonist,
sometimes even taking the protagonist’s point of view in a story (Bower, 1975; Black,
Turner, & Bower, 1979; Bower & Morrow, 1990). Following the movements and
locations of the protagonist creates what Morrow (1994, 1995) has termed a “Here-andNow” perspective (or the deictic center, Segal & Duchan, 1997). Textural cues, such as
prepositions (e.g., The fireman walked down the street) or verb aspect (walk/walked) help
readers determine a character’s present location in a narrative (Bower & Morrow, 1990;
Morrow, 1985; Morrow & Greenspan, 1988). Moreover, it has been shown that readers
keep track of and are attentive to inconsistencies in a protagonist’s location (Black,
Turner, & Bower, 1979), regardless of whether this information is explicitly or implicitly
described in the text (Morrow, Bower, & Greenspan, 1989; Morrow, Greenspan, &
Bower, 1987).
Perhaps one of the more intriguing findings from spatial narrative research is the
effect of varying described distances between characters, locations, and important objects
on comprehension. The map-and-narrative task originally developed by Morrow and
colleagues (Morrow, Bower, & Greenspan, 1989; Morrow, Greenspan, & Bower, 1987),
and subsequently modified by Rinck and Bower (1995), requires that participants first
memorize a map of a fictional building with many rooms and to then read a narrative that
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describes a character’s movement within the building and interactions with available
objects (Rinck, 2005; Rinck & Bower, 1995). These narratives detail a room-by-room
account of the character’s movement through the building, and occasionally, as people
are reading, they are probed with items that vary as to how close they are to the
character’s current location (e.g., same room, previous room, distant room). In general,
longer reading and response times are observed as the distance between the protagonist
and target items increases. This phenomenon is known as the gradient of spatial
accessibility (Rinck & Bower, 1995). This suggests that readers mentally move through
the spatial locations along with the character (but see Pylyshyn, 1981 for an alternative
view of visual imagery).
While there are some circumstances when the gradient of spatial accessibility is
not observed, such as when the spatial layout of the building changes during the narrative
(Wolf, Hasebrook, & Rinck, 1999) or when the characters movements are nonunidirectional (Rapp, Klug, & Taylor, 2006), the gradient of spatial accessibility is a
rather robust finding and has been observed under many experimental conditions. For
example, a gradient of spatial accessibility has been found regardless of variations in the
described environment (Rinck, Williams, Bower, & Becker, 1996), direction of spatial
distance (Rinck et al., 1996), language of the narrative (Rinck et al., 1996), targeted probe
items (Rinck et al., 1996), the size of the rooms of the building (Rinck, Hähnel, Bower, &
Glowalla, 1997), and whether or not the location room is explicitly stated (Rinck, Bower,
& Wolf, 1998). In addition, some evidence indicates parallel increases in reading and
response times for the spatial accessibility and other situational dimensions, such as
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protagonist goals (Bower & Rinck, 1999; Rinck & Bower, 2004) and time (Rinck &
Bower, 2000), suggesting an interactive effect.
Evidence for the effects of distances on spatial situation models are not
necessarily task-specific and have also been observed in situations where the participants
were not required to memorize a map of a location prior to narrative reading. In a classic
study, Glenberg, Meyer, and Lindem (1987) had participants read short narratives in
which an item was described as proximally near or distant to the protagonist. For
example,
(10) John was preparing for a marathon in August.
(11a) (near) After doing a few warm-up exercises, he put on his sweatshirt and
went jogging.
(11b) (distant) After doing a few warm-up exercises, he took off his sweatshirt
and went jogging.
Note that in one sentence the protagonist distances himself from an object (e.g., the
sweatshirt) by taking it off and in the other sentence a close spatial relationship is formed
with the object when it is put on. Response times for probed items were faster if the item
was described as being proximal to the protagonist, as compared with items that were
distant from the protagonist. These results support the idea that spatial distances are
important to situation models of narratives because readers clearly update information
about spatial relations by monitoring the actions of the protagonist. This finding, that
readers are sensitive to the described spatial distance between important objects and
characters, has come to be called the spatial distance effect.
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Spatial distance effects have been observed in non-narrative contexts as well. In a
similar study that used a virtual environment instead of a narrative, Radvansky and
Copeland (2006) reported that participants demonstrated better on-line recall for recently
acquired items as compared with discarded items while navigating through a virtual
environment. Importantly, memory for these items was most affected by a change in
spatial location. That is, when there was not a change in location, objects were more
accessible in memory than when there was a change in location. In two other studies,
Copeland, Magliano, and Radvansky (2006; see also Magliano, Radvansky, & Copeland,
2007) reported that participants’ success in a video game was related to both the spatial
proximity between the player, allies, and enemies, as well as recent changes in spatial
location. Thus, these studies support the narrative studies that show that people are
affected by changes in spatial location.
The spatial framework theory (Franklin & Tversky, 1990) specifies that readers
rely on their interactions and perceptual experiences with the world to comprehend
spatial information. More specifically, representations of the location of (and relationship
between) objects described in a narrative are interpreted relative to three asymmetric axes
of the human body: a vertical axis corresponding to the head/feet and two vertical axes
corresponding to the front/back and left/right perspectives. Knowledge about the
fundamental laws of gravity also governs the construction of a mental representation,
particularly with regard to objects that require the vertical (head/feet) perceptual senses.
Work in this domain has repeatedly shown that objects requiring head/feet
representations are most accessible, front/back are moderately accessible, and left/right
are least accessible (Bryant & Tversky, 1992; Bryant, Tversky, & Franklin, 1992;
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Franklin & Tversky, 1990). The explanation for these findings is that people assemble a
mental representation of the spatial environment and important objects in the
environment are matched to the relevant axis of the body (head and feet, front and back,
and left and right).
Although researchers have been successful at isolating some of the relevant
properties associated with spatial situation models, efforts to obtain evidence for space, as
an independent dimension, has been met with mixed results. Reading times for situational
inconsistencies in narratives has been the hallmark metric for testing a dimension’s
unique contribution to reading comprehension. To date, reports of longer reading times
for spatially inconsistent narratives have emerged (O’Brien & Albrecht, 1992; de Vega,
1995; Haenggi, Gernsbacher, & Bolliger, 1994; Rinck & Hähnel, 2000), suggesting that
readers do indeed monitor spatial information during reading. Given these findings, one
would therefore expect that readers might observe other types of situational anomalies
during the course of narrative reading.
Zwaan, Magliano, and Graesser (1995) had participants read narratives in which a
character was described as being in a spatially continuous or a spatially distinct location
(a spatial discontinuity). Although this manipulation produced longer second pass reading
times, it had little to no effect on initial sentence reading times. This outcome was
particularly striking, given that longer initial reading times were observed for temporal
and causal discontinuities. Zwaan, Radvansky, Hilliard, and Curiel (1998) reported
similar outcomes for sentence- and clause- reading times for situational discontinuities.
Thus, while readers do appear to monitor spatial inconsistencies, they do not always
show evidence of monitoring spatial discontinuities.
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One explanation for these incongruent outcomes is that task instructions may have
had an effect on participants’ performance. In fact, Zwaan and colleagues have
investigated this possibility (Zwaan & van Oostendorp, 1993; Zwaan, et al., 1995;
Zwaan, et al, 1998). Participants in these experiments were instructed to either read
normally or read for memory. This manipulation had little informative effect on reading
times, but did produce small group differences, to the extent that those instructed to read
for memory had longer times as compared with those instructed to read naturally. In
addition, a recent study by Radvansky and Copeland (2010) has suggested the possibility
that reading time effects may not always be observed because spatial updating may be
easier than other, less natural types of updating, such as changes in time. As it stands,
spatial situation model construction appears to be an integral component of the normal
reading process.
Another possibility why researchers report contrasting outcomes for studies
examining space as a situation model dimension may have more to do with the text used
in the studies. Texts that focus readers’ attention on spatial information are more likely to
produce effects consistent with the situation model perspective, as compared with texts
that focus the readers attention on other, or even multiple, situational dimensions
(Radvansky & Copeland, 2000; Rinck, 2005; Zwaan & van Oostendorp, 1993). Early
investigations into readers’ memory for spatial information provide some evidence for
this hypothesis.
Consider a well-known study conducted by Bransford, Barclay, and Franks
(1972). For their experiment, participants listened to sets of sentences describing varying
spatial arrangements, such as
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(12a) Three turtles rested on a floating log, and a fish swam beneath them.
(13a) Three turtles rested beside a floating log, and a fish swam beneath them.
Note the difference in the spatial layout (on vs. beside). In sentence (12a), the referent is
the turtles that are resting on the log, whereas in sentence (13a) the referent is the turtles
that are resting beside the log. In both sentences, the fish is described as swimming
beneath the turtles, but the fish is only swimming beneath the log in the first sentence.
After the participants heard the sentence, they were administered a recognition task that
included the same, as well as subtly altered constructions of the sentences, such as
(12b) Three turtles rested on a floating log, and a fish swam beneath it.
(13b) Three turtles rested beside a floating log, and a fish swam beneath it.
In these constructions, the pronominal referents are identical with respect to the original
sentences, but the spatial layouts have changed, such that in both cases, the fish is
described as swimming beneath the log. To reiterate, in (12a) and (12b) the fish is
swimming beneath both the turtles and log. However, in (13a) the fish is swimming
beneath only the turtles, while in (13b) the fish is beneath only the log.
The outcomes from this study were clear: readers do not simply create surfacelevel representations for text, even when they are instructed to do so; rather they form a
higher-level representation of the described spatial situation. The results from the
recognition tests indicated a consistent pattern: participants often confused sentences such
as (12a) and (12b), yet rarely confused sentences such as (13a) and (13b). Again, the
wording difference between (12a) and (12b) was the same as between (13a) and (13b);
the difference, however, was that the former referred to the same spatial situation and
were confusable and the latter referred to different spatial situations and were not
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confused. Thus, when a given text focuses readers’ attention on spatial information,
evidence for situational representations are more likely to be observed, as compared with
texts that prompt the activation of multiple situations models.
In a similar experiment, Mani and Johnson-Laird (1982) had participants read
short determinate and indeterminate descriptions of a spatial arrangement. A determinate
description precisely described the physical locations of the items (e.g., A is behind D. A
is to the left of B. C is to the right of B.)
(14)

A

B

C

D
Indeterminate descriptions permitted alternative arrangement possibilities (e.g., A is
behind D. A is to the left of B. C is to the right of A.).
(15a) A

B

C

(15b) A

D

C

B

D

After reading the descriptions, the participants were then presented with a
diagram of the spatial arrangement, for which they were instructed to decide if the
diagram was consistent or inconsistent with the text description. Finally, they completed
an unexpected memory test. Results from the recall task suggested that people created a
situation model for determinate descriptions, but a text-based representation for
indeterminate descriptions. In other words, they remembered the gist of the determinate
descriptions because those descriptions permitted only one spatial arrangement whereas
the indeterminate descriptions, where it was unclear which of the possible spatial mental
model arrangements was intended, people relied on their memory of the text.
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In conclusion, readers form situation models for spatial information. Studies of
the fan effect (Radvansky, et al., 1991; Radvansky, et al., 1993) show that readers
organize information and create situation models based on spatial locations. They
combine related pieces of information to form unified representations and create multiple
representations for unrelated pieces of information. Readers also monitor spatial shifts in
narratives and update their situation model accordingly (Morrow & Greenspan, 1988;
Morrow, 1990; Morrow, 1985). Successful integration of spatial information depends on
the described distances between characters and locations, as indicated by the gradient of
spatial accessibility (Rinck & Bower, 1995) or the described distances between characters
as objects, as indicated by spatial distance effects (Glenberg, et al., 1997). Finally,
evidence for spatial situation models is strongest when other spatial descriptions are most
salient and other situational dimensions are not required for comprehension (Bransford,
Barclay, & Franks, 1972; Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982).
Functionality
The creation of a coherent spatial situation model may be facilitated by the
relationship between items in a described spatial array. Spatial relations may be
expressed in different ways: (1) lexically (i.e. prepositions such as over, in, above,
below), (2) in property (e.g., shoe and laces: laces are used to fasten the shoe to the foot),
or (3) orientation (e.g., floor and bookshelf: the floor supports the bookshelf). Related
items are assimilated in the current situation model more easily than items that are not
related (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976). Work in the spatial cognition domain has
demonstrated that the more closely associated items are, the easier it is to retrieve items
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from memory when required to do so, regardless of symmetry (Coventry, Venn, Smith, &
Morely, 2003).
Theorists have speculated that how readers perceive the interactions between
items, as well as how these items might be used, is also critical to understanding how
spatial relations are comprehended (Coventry, 1997; Coventry & Garrod, 2004; Garrod &
Sanford, 1989; Michotte, 1963; Vandelosie, 1984; 1991). For example, if one were
presented with a cap and a tube of toothpaste, one might observe that both objects are
related in property and in purpose (the cap is used to keep the toothpaste inside the tube).
Of course, knowledge about the world is required to make the inference that the cap and
tube are purposefully related. Stated differently then, it could be proposed that the cap
and tube of toothpaste are functionally related. That is, the cap functions to preserve the
toothpaste contained in the tube.
In a demonstration of the effect of functionality on spatial relatedness, CarlsonRadvansky, Covey, and Lattanzi (1999) had participants place pictures of located objects
(e.g., a tube of toothpaste v. a tube of oil paint) above or below a referenced object (e.g.,
a toothbrush). Presenting the referenced items as aligned or misaligned with their
respective center mass permitted a direct test of the importance of functionality on spatial
relations. The key idea was that placement tended to be further from the center of mass
for the referenced item when there was a functional spatial relation present. In the
example, because toothpaste is applied to the bristles of a toothbrush, people located
“above” to be closer to the end with the bristles. However, for the paint, “above” was
closer to the physical center of the toothbrush. In short, participants naturally perceived
the spatial relations between objects in terms of functionality, even when they were not
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prompted to do so. These findings support the notion that functional relatedness is central
to processing spatial relations.
As another example, suppose a man was standing below an old bridge. While
there is nothing inherently functional about a man standing below a bridge, the
appropriate context can lead to a functional spatial relationship between story elements.
Here, the old bridge can provide the protagonist with shelter from rain. However, if the
circumstances were changed- if a sudden downpour of rain was not mentioned in the textthen the fact that the protagonist was standing under the old bridge would seem hardly
relevant to the reader. For example, if instead the protagonist were attempting to read a
map on a dark, moonless night, the old bridge would be of little functional significance to
the protagonist, as compared with other objects in the environment, such as a streetlight.
Using narratives with spatial relations similar to the aforementioned one,
researchers (Radvansky & Copeland, 2000; Radvansky, Copeland, & Zwaan, 2003)
explored the effect of narrative context and functional spatial relations on readers’ recall
and recognition of story events. The results from these experiments indicated that stories
that specified functional spatial relationships were better comprehended than stories that
specified nonfunctional spatial relationships. Moreover, reading times for the critical
sentences, as well as recall and recognition scores were superior for functional, as
compared with nonfunctional spatial relations. That these findings were due not simply to
differences in lower-levels of discourse representation (i.e., surface or textbase
representations), as reported by Radvansky et al. (2003), only furthers the argument that
functional spatial relations facilitate the construction of integrated situation models.
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Jahn (2004) argued that causal descriptions in narratives also contribute to the
comprehension of spatial relations. In his view, meaningful interactions between
characters promote stronger representations of spatial relations. Consider the following
example taken from Jahn (2004).
(16) Two Zebras graze next to a shrub and an antelope trots towards them.
In this example, the object (the shrub) serves as a reference point for the spatial array
(e.g. the zebras are already spatially proximal to the shrub, but the antelope is not).
Importantly, there is no meaningful relationship between the zebras and the antelope. One
might expect that little interaction would occur between the zebras and the antelope save
for perhaps a brief visual acknowledgement. Now consider a different scenario from Jahn
(2004):
(17) Two zebras graze next to a shrub and a lion trots towards them.
Here, the spatial arrangement of objects and characters is identical to sentence (16), but,
in contrast, the reader is likely to anticipate a meaningful interaction between the
characters. That is, one assumes that the lion is described as moving towards the zebras,
not to feed from the shrub, but rather to satisfy its predatory intentions towards the
zebras. According to Jahn (2004), the lion’s intention to attack the zebras suggests a
causal relationship. In other words, the lion is trotting towards the zebras because it
intends to attack. Therefore, functional relations in narrative spatial descriptions are
necessary, but not sufficient to promote spatial representations. The causal agent in
narratives is the focus of the readers’ attention, rather than the functional relations
between objects and characters. Consequently, the causal component of the narrative
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increases the likelihood of the spatial relation being encoded into the situation model
representation.
Indeed, Jahn (2004) reported that participants were better at discriminating similar
recognition sentences from different recognition sentences when the sentences described
predator-prey relations (e.g., the zebras and the lions), as compared with sentences that
described allied relations (e.g., the zebras and the antelope). As further evidence for the
effect of causal relations on spatial representations, additional experiments were
conducted in which participants were instructed to determine (yes/no) whether a threat
was present in the description. The rationale for this manipulation was to ensure that
participants observed the spatial relations and inferred the causal relations between the
characters. Again, the danger manipulation had a significant effect on recognition scores
and improved recognition scores for peaceful descriptions. Thus, when participants were
instructed to observe spatial and causal relations, performance improved.
Jahn’s (2004) findings raise a number of interesting points beyond the earlier
ideas of functionality and causality improving memory for spatial relations (i.e., the
causal-functional hypothesis). That readers appear to retain information of a survival
flavor better than neutral stimuli is consistent with a developing body of work (e.g.,
Nairne, Pandeirada, & Thompson, 2008; Nairne, Thompson, & Panderirada, 2007;
Weinstein, Bugg, & Roediger, 2008). Proponents of the “adaptive memory hypothesis”
(Nairne, et al., 2008) propose that the human cognitive system is attuned to survivalrelevant information. Work in this domain consists primarily of priming research
participants to imagine themselves in particular situations (e.g., stranded in the grasslands
in need of food and water) and to then rate a set of given words on their relevance to the
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situation. After rating the words and completing a distracter task, participants are then
given a surprise recall test. Outcomes from these studies have evidenced a fairly
consistent pattern in support of the adaptive memory perspective: participants who were
primed to imagine themselves in a survival scenario generally exhibit better recall for
words than those in the competing conditions. Thus, it seems there is a memory benefit to
associating information with survival / danger situations. That is, regardless of whether
participants are more focused on survival information or if the survival information may
promote arousal, there appears to be a clear memory benefit. However, currently it is not
clear whether survival / danger contexts improve memory for spatial relations above and
beyond simple functional relations.
Summary of Literature Review
The current state of research on how people read and understand narrative text
suggests a complex interaction between both low- and high-level cognitive systems,
namely perceptual encoding, working memory, and long-term memory. The collective
efforts of these resources culminate in the formation of three interdependent levels of
mental representation for discourse: (1) the surface form, (2) propositional textbase, and
(3) situation model (Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan &
Radvansky, 1998). Situation models are mental representations of the state of affairs
described in a text and are thought to be defined by five narrative dimensions (or
indices): (1) the protagonist, (2) goals/intentionality, (3) time, (4) causation, and (5) space
(Zwaan, et al. 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Spatial situation models are mental
representation of the narrative environment and how characters interact in the
environment. Radvansky and colleagues (2000; 2003) showed that relationships that are
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functionally congruent are often better understood as compared with relationships that are
functionally incongruent or nonfunctional. However, Jahn (2004) suggested that
functional spatial relations also require specification of causal information. According to
this perspective, causal relations are most salient when a character is facing an imminent
threat. These findings appear to be consistent with a developing body of work on the
adaptive memory hypothesis (e.g., Nairne, et al., 2007; 2008; Weinstein, et al., 2008),
which postulates that the human cognitive system is sensitive to survival-relevant
information.
The current study
The objective of the current experiment was to determine whether survival-based
scenarios (as expressed in narratives that describe characters in life-threatening
situations) contribute to the development and maintenance of situation models for
functional spatial relations. More specifically, the focus of the current investigation was
to determine whether, as Jahn (2004) suggested, causal factors inherent in survival/nonsurvival narratives focus readers’ attention on functional/non-functional spatial relations.
This study will expand on Jahn’s (2004) and Radvansky and Copeland’s (2000) studies
by comparing the unique effects of survival context and functionality, as well as their
interaction.
Participants read twenty short, original narratives that include two types of critical
sentences that each can be in one of two conditions (yielding a total of four
combinations): (1) survival or non-survival sentences in which the character’s life may or
may not be at risk and (2) functional or nonfunctional sentences that describe a
contextually useful or contextually non useful relationship with an item in the spatial
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environment (all stories are listed in the Appendix). To reduce the likelihood that
participants would detect the purpose of the study, 16 non-experimental filler stories that
did not include survival/non-survival or functional/nonfunctional critical sentences were
also presented. Also, to ensure that participants were reading for comprehension, two
comprehension questions were answered after reading each narrative. This data was only
used to exclude participants who scored below a score of 75% (i.e., participants who did
not take the task seriously). Reading times for the functional/nonfunctional sentences
were recorded. After reading all of the narratives, participants then responded to forced
choice recognition questions for the critical sentences.
Four potential outcome patterns were considered for the critical sentence reading
times. One possibility was that both survival and functionality would equally contribute
to story reading times (Figure 1, Appendix). In this scenario, the fastest reading times
would likely be observed for the survival-functional stories because both components, the
survival aspect and the functional aspect, contribute to ease of processing. In other words,
the effects of survival and functional contexts are additive here and there would not be an
interaction. This outcome would be consistent with the faster reading times observed for
functional sentences reported by Radvansky and Copeland (2000) and faster reading
times for survival sentences reported by Jahn (2004). Accordingly, this outcome pattern
would suggest that functional-survival relations should be more easily integrated into a
reader’s situation model. A second possibility is that survival and functional content
would have equal effects on reading times (Figure 2, Appendix). Here it would be
expected that the presence of either survival or functional content would be enough to
speed up processing (i.e., faster reading times). Here there would be an interaction
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because reading times would be fast if either survival or functional content was present
(or both), but not for non-survival nonfunctional content. A third possibility is that
survival relations would drive the overall reading time effect (Figure 3, Appendix). In
this scenario, it is not the functionality that leads to faster processing, but only the
survival content. However, based on the work by Radvansky and Copeland (2000) where
effects of functionality were observed, this outcome seems unlikely. Finally, a fourth
possibility is that functional relations would drive the overall reading time effect (Figure
4, Appendix). For this outcome, it is not the survival content that leads to faster
processing time, only the functional relations.
As with the predictions for the critical sentence reading time outcomes, four
potential outcome patterns were considered for the recognition scores. One possibility is
that both survival and functionality status would contribute additively to recognition
scores. Evidence for this outcome would be indicated by a non-interactive effect for both
conditions, with the best memory performance for content that was in the survivalfunctional condition (Figure 4, Appendix). This outcome would suggest that both
survival and functional content are strongly integrated into the readers complete situation
model. A second possibility is that survival status, functionality, or both, would equally
affect recognition (Figure 5, Appendix). This outcome suggests that improved
recognition memory is strongly affected by the presence of either survival or functional
relations (or both). A third possibility is that only survival content would affect
recognition memory performance (Figure 6, Appendix). As with the reading times, this
outcome seems to be the least likely (see Radvansky & Copeland, 2000). Finally, a
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fourth potential outcome is that only functionality would affect recognition scores. This
outcome would be consistent with work by Radvansky & Copeland (2000).
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Participants
A total of 40 undergraduate men and women (ages 18-30 years) were recruited from the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas psychology subject pool and were awarded class credit
for their participation. Although there were no restrictions on the ethnic backgrounds of
the recruited participants, some exclusionary criteria were implemented for the current
experiment (e.g., only native English-speaking participants were permitted to participate).
Materials
Stories
Twenty original experimental and 16 filler stories were created for the
experiment. The stories were loosely based on those used by Jahn (2004) and Radvansky
and colleagues (Radvansky & Copeland, 2000; Radvansky et al., 2003). All 20
experimental narratives are available in the Appendix. The experimental stories were
constructed so that each contained one critical sentence that conveyed a threat to the
protagonist for the survival version of the stories, but a non-threat for the non-survival
version of the stories. For example, in the example story from the Appendix, for the first
critical sentence the non-survival version is “As he reached, he knocked over a container
of water.” In contrast, the survival version is “As he reached, he knocked over a large jug
of rat poison.” Clearly, the latter sentence is more critical toward the character’s survival
because rat poison is more likely to kill a person.
In addition, the stories contained one critical sentence that conveyed a functional
spatial relation when a character interacts with an object in one way, but a nonfunctional
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relation when the object was interacted with in another way. For example, in the
example story from the Appendix, the character either holds the plastic tarp above him
(functional condition) or holds the plastic tarp next to him (nonfunctional condition).
Here, the functional relation in the survival version of the story is that the protagonist can
use an object in the environment (the plastic tarp) to protect himself from a danger,
whereas in the non-survival version the plastic tarp serves as a way to keep from getting
wet. Regardless of the survival condition, holding the tarp next to him does not serve a
function.
To counterbalance the incidence of functional, nonfunctional, survival, and nonsurvival sentences, there were four versions of each story. Each participant read five
stories containing a functional survival scenario, five stories containing a functional nonsurvival scenario, five stories containing a nonfunctional survival scenario, and five
stories containing a nonfunctional, non-survival scenario. Across all stories, for a given
reader, each condition occurred equally often at each position. All four text versions were
rotated across participants. The stories were 15 sentences long, with the survival and
functional critical sentences at approximately one third and two thirds of the way through
each story, respectively. Each version of the critical sentences was matched for number
of syllables. Included within the main experimental trials were 16 filler stories. In
addition, there were two practice stories to familiarize people with the procedure; the
practice stories were also filler stories.
Story ratings
A separate cohort of participants (n = 24) that did not complete the main
experiment were asked to judged if the stories were equally readable (i.e., participants
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were asked to rate how well the story flowed and made sense). Mean ratings for the four
versions of the stories were as follows (see also, Table 1 in the appendix): survivalfunctional (M = 5.34, SE = .08), survival-nonfunctional (M = 5.19, SE = .10), nonsurvival-functional (M = 5.24, SE = .11), and non-survival-nonfunctional (M = 5.15, SE =
.08). A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the ratings
for the four story conditions. Ratings for the survival and non-survival stories did not
differ significantly, F (1, 19) = 1.09, p > .311. Ratings for the functional and
nonfunctional conditions also did not differ significantly, F (1, 19) = 1.30, p > .269.
Finally, there was no significant interaction between ratings for the survival and
functional stories, F (1, 19) = .13, p > .719. Thus, the four versions of the stories were all
rated similarly.
Stories were rated on danger and functionality by yet another separate cohort of
participants (n = 10) that did not complete the main experiment. These participants read
and rated versions of the experimental stories that contained either a critical sentence that
described characters in a survival condition (i.e., danger was present) or a critical
sentence that described characters in a non-survival condition (i.e., danger was not
present). Presentation order (survival, non-survival) was counterbalanced. After reading
each story, participants’ were then asked to rate the level of danger described in the story
on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 = no danger present and 7 = extremely dangerous.
Overall, the stories that described a survival situation (M = 4.94, SE = .19) were clearly
rated as more dangerous than the stories that described a non-survival situation (M =
2.69, SE = .19), t (9) = 8.02, p < .001.
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In addition to the danger rating task, participants were also asked to determine,
from a given set of options, whether each sentence could complete the critical spatial
relation (i.e., whether it was plausible that the sentence could be in that story) and to then
rate the sentence options as to how well they fit. The critical sentence describing the
spatial relation was omitted from the story (i.e., there was a gap where that critical
sentence would appear in the story). Participants were asked to decide (yes/no) if four
potential sentences could possibly fit with the story. In addition, the participants were
also asked to rate how well each sentence choice fit with the story. The potential
sentences that were assessed for acceptability and rated for fit included: (1) the critical
sentence describing a functional spatial relation, (2) the critical sentence describing a
nonfunctional spatial relation, (3) a distracter sentence describing a functional spatial
relation with an object that was not mentioned in the story, and (4) a distracter sentence
describing a nonfunctional spatial relation with an object that was not mentioned in the
story. Ratings for each answer choice were entered on a Likert-type scale where 1= poor
fit and 7 = good fit.
Mean sentence acceptability judgments are listed in Table 2 (Appendix). Sentence
fit judgments (yes/no) for the functional, nonfunctional, and distracter critical sentences
differed significantly from one another, χ2 (5) = 34.93, p < .001. Pair wise comparisons of
the judgments for each of the four sentence conditions (survival-functional, survivalnonfunctional, non-survival-functional, and non-survival-nonfunctional) as well as the
two distracter sentences were conducted using a Wilcoxon signed ranks test. As can be
seen from Table 3 (Appendix), although ratings for the four sentence conditions differed
significantly from ratings for the distracter sentences (all significance values were less
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than .01), ratings for each of the four critical sentence conditions (i.e., the non-distracter
sentences) did not differ significantly (all significance values were greater than.05).
Mean fit ratings for the critical spatial relation sentences are available from Table
2 (Appendix). Overall, the functional critical sentences were rated as having a better fit
with the stories as compared with the nonfunctional sentences, F (1, 9) = 234.29, p <
.001. In addition, both functional and nonfunctional critical sentences were rated as
being a better fit with the stories as compared with the distracter sentences, F (1, 9) =
3.89, p < .001. Thus, while both the functional and nonfunctional sentences were
acceptable in the stories, the functional sentences were rated as a better fit with the
narrative context (i.e., a better fit with the causal structure).
Forced choice recognition test
One forced-choice recognition question was created for each story based on the
functional critical sentences (see Appendix). For each question, four choices were
available to the participant: (1) the functional critical sentence, (2) the nonfunctional
critical sentence, (3) the functional relation with a wrong object, and (4) the
nonfunctional relation with a wrong object. For example, in the first story in the
Appendix, the forced-choice recognition question was: “Which of the following
sentences appeared in the story? (1) Earl was holding the plastic tarp above him, (2) Earl
was holding the plastic tarp next to him, (3)Earl was holding the newspaper above him,
(4) Earl was holding the newspaper next to him.” The order of the choices was
randomized for each question.
Finally, two comprehension questions were created for each story. The questions
were used to ensure that people had read the stories for comprehension. For the sample
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story, the questions were “Did Earl mop the floor?” and “Were there boxes in the storage
room?” Overall, half of the questions were true and half were not. None of the questions
asked about information in the critical sentences.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. The texts were presented on a PC compatible computer. The text was white on a black background in 40-column mode.
People read the two practice stories first, followed by the experimental and filler texts.
The practice stories were always filler stories and never included functional or survival
relations. The stories were read in a different random order for each person. Reading was
self-paced; the texts were presented one sentence at a time. Each of the critical items was
a single sentence. After reading a sentence, the subject pressed the space bar and the next
sentence appeared. The computer recorded reading times. After each story two
comprehension questions were presented in red font. Participants were instructed to
answer by clicking one of the two buttons on the mouse with the right hand. The left
mouse button was pressed for “yes, this is true”, and the right mouse button for “no, this
is false”. There was an equal number of “yes” and “no” answers.
After reading all of the stories, participants were presented with the forced-choice
recognition test. Participants’ entered their responses by selecting the appropriately
labeled numerical key on the keyboard (1, 2, 3, or 4). Thus, participants read all of the
stories, including the filler stories, before beginning the recognition test. Recognition
items were presented in a random order for each participant, and the question for each
story (with the four corresponding options) was presented by itself on the computer
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screen. Immediately after entering their response for an item, the computer presented the
next question with its choices. There were no recognition questions for the filler stories.
.
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
The analyses were based on manipulations of functionality and survival. Thus,
the experiment was a 2 (condition: survival vs. non-survival) x 2 (condition: functional
vs. nonfunctional) design. Both reading time and recognition accuracy were the
dependent measures
Outliers were dealt with using a procedure described by Van Selst and Jolicoeur
(1994). Briefly, this procedure involves calculating a standard deviation criterion cut-off
value that is based on the sample size. Although a cutoff score of 75% accuracy for the
comprehension questions was set for inclusion in the analyses, all participants scored
above the criterion (M = .87, SD = .08), so none of the participants’ scores were removed
from the analyses described below.
Recognition
Critical sentence recognition scores were submitted to a 2 (functionality) x 2
(survival) repeated measures ANOVA for both a subject and item analysis. For all
results, the subscript 1 denotes a subject analysis and the subscript 2 denotes an item
analysis. The main effect of functionality was significant for the subject analysis, F1
(1,39) = 21.07, p < .001, ηp2 = .35, and marginally significant for the item analysis, F2
(1,19)=3.78, p = .07, ηp2 = .16, with people accurately recognizing more of the functional
than the nonfunctional spatial items.. There was also a main effect of survival, which was
significant for the subject analysis, F1 (1, 39) = 4.29, p = .045, ηp2= .099, and marginally
significant for the item analysis, F2 (1,19)=3.29, p = .09, ηp2 = .15. Recognition was better
for non-survival than survival stories. Finally, the two-way interaction between survival
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and functionality was not significant, F1 (1,39) = 1.48, p = .231, ηp2 = .04, F2 (1,19)=.73,
p = .40, ηp2 = .04. As can be seen from Table 3, the effect of functionality appears to be
pretty clear. Performance was high for the functional sentences for both the survival and
non-survival conditions, and these two conditions did not differ from each other, F1
(1,39) = .438., p = .51, ηp2 = .011, F2 (1,19) = .15, p = .71, ηp2 = .008. While the
nonfunctional items were remembered more poorly, this seemed to be the case
particularly for the survival condition, which had the lowest recognition percentage.
Indeed, recall for nonfunctional critical sentences was marginally better under nonsurvival conditions, as compared with survival conditions, F1 (1,39) = 3.77, p = .06, ηp2 =
.088, F2 (1,19) = 3.28, p = .09, ηp2 =.147. Figures 9, 10, and 11 (Appendix) illustrate
outcomes for the recognition data.
Reading time
As with the critical sentence recognition items, reading times were submitted to a
2 (functionality) x 2 (survival) repeated measures ANOVA based on both subjects and
items. As with the recognition data, the main effect of functionality was significant, F1
(1,39) = 4.03, p = .052, ηp2 = .094, F2 (1,19)=7.08, p = .02, ηp2 = .27, with faster overall
reading times for the functional critical sentences. However, in contrast to the recognition
data, the main effect of survival was not significant, F1 (1,39) = .142, p = .71, ηp2 = .004,
F2 (1,19)= .06, p = .81, ηp2 = .003. Nevertheless, although the majority of the variance in
critical sentence reading times was explained by the effect of functionality, survival may
have contributed some variance as well, as indicated in the significant two-way
interaction between functionality and survival, F1 (1,39) = 6.90, p = .012, ηp2 = .15, F2
(1,19) =5.24, p = .034, ηp2 = .22.
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Follow-up tests (see Table 4) showed that although reading times for the
functional critical sentences did not differ between survival conditions, F1(1,39) = 1.90, p
= .176, ηp2 = .046, F2 = 1.90, p = .184, ηp2 = .091 slower reading times were observed for
the nonfunctional sentences under the survival condition, relative to those in the nonsurvival condition, F(1,39) = 3.55, p = .067, ηp2 =.08, F2 = 1.89, p = .185, ηp2 = .090
although it was only marginally significant. Figures 12, 13, and 14 (Appendix) illustrate
outcomes for the reading time data.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECCOMENDATIONS
The results of the present experiment suggest that narrative comprehension of
spatial relationships between characters and objects in an environment depends more on
the functionality of the object (Radvansky & Copeland, 2000; Radvansky et al., 2003),
than the causal reasons underlying the spatial relationship (Jahn, 2004). Here, the overall
effect of functionality emerged from readers’ comprehension, regardless of survival
status. In fact, survival status did not seem to enhance memory of the functional
information, as evidenced by the similar means for the functional information from both
the survival and non-survival versions of the stories.
This was surprising because it was predicted that the survival context would
enhance readers’ memories of the story information. First, Jahn (2004) reported that
people were better at recognizing sentences that described characters in dangerous
scenarios (e.g., a lion stalking a zebra), as compared with sentences that described
characters in neutral scenarios (e.g., a zebra near an antelope). Second, a more recent,
related body of work by Nairne and colleagues (Nairne, et al. 2008; 2007) showed that
people are better at remembering information learned in a survival context (e.g., stranded
in the grasslands needing food and water) as compared with memory for information
learned in a neutral context (e.g., on vacation). Thus, despite the availability of evidence
favoring the notion of superior memory for survival-relevant information, the results of
the present experiment do not appear to neatly conform to those previous findings.
Nevertheless, survival context does seem to have some type of effect on memory
and comprehension First, it seems likely that the functional sentences were likely to have
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been integrated into the situation model while reading. These reading times were faster,
suggesting that they were more easily processed by readers. In contrast, the reading times
for the nonfunctional sentences, particularly in the survival condition, were quite long.
This suggests that the nonfunctional information in the survival condition was not
expected when it was encountered, and was thus not easily integrated into the situation
model (hence the longer times). This conclusion parallels a body of work by O’Brien and
colleagues, who reported longer reading times for sentences in stories that included
inconsistent information about the location of a protagonist (Hakala & O’Brien, 1995;
Myers, O’Brien, Albrecht, & Mason, 1994; O’Brien & Albrecht, 1992), as well as
research on the processing of other situation model dimensions, such as time (Rink,
Gámez, Diáz, & de Vega, 2003; Rink, Hähnel, & Becker, 2001). Accordingly, because it
was less likely to be integrated into the situation model, memory for these nonfunctional
relations was worse at recognition, particularly in this survival–nonfunctional condition.
It may be that people are not as likely to encode the nonfunctional information into the
situation model in this survival condition, and as a consequence, during recognition
people may reconstruct (e.g., Bartlett, 1932) the spatial relations to fit the survival
motivation, and subsequently mistakenly pick the functional sentence.
Note that this outcome cannot be explained as an artifact of the story content or
unusualness of the nonfunctional information (e.g., the von Restorff effect) because that
unusualness would produce better memory for that information, when in fact, memory for
nonfunctional information was worse. Also, recall that the critical functional sentences
for all stories were rated by an independent sample of participants. Importantly,
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participants rated the both the functional and nonfunctional sentences as acceptable fits
with the story, as compared with distracter sentences.
At the outset of the current experiment, four possible outcomes were predicted for
the critical sentence reading times and four possible outcomes were predicted for forcedchoice recognition items. Consistent with Radvansky and Copeland (2000) (and Figure 4,
Appendix), regardless of survival condition, faster critical sentence reading times were
observed for the functional sentences, relative to the nonfunctional sentences.
Nevertheless, contrary to expectations, slower reading times were observed for the
nonfunctional sentences in the survival condition. This outcome suggests that
participants’ integration of that story content into a coherent situation model was quite
difficult. In general, better recognition scores for the functional items, relative to the nonfunctional items (Figure 11, Appendix), are also consistent with Radvansky and
Copeland (2000). However, weaker recognition scores for the survival-nonfunctional
content, relative to the non-survival-nonfunctional content, was unexpected.
The outcomes for the current experiment compliment the existing literature on
functional spatial relationships. Radvansky and Copeland (2000) suggested two general
requirements for the construction of a functional spatial situation model. First, for a
functional relation to exist, the state of one character must (or could) be affected by their
interaction with another story element (be that an object or character). Second, the
interaction must be important to the reader. However, the value of the described
interaction is left to the discretion of the reader; some interactions may be judged as more
vital than others. Consistent with this perspective, both Radvansky and Copeland (2000)
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and Radvansky et al. (2003) found that functional spatial relations were read faster and
better remembered than nonfunctional spatial relations.
Subsequently, Jahn (2004) argued that causality (in the form of survival
situations) was a necessary prerequisite for the spontaneous construction of situation
models for spatial relations because readers would be more motivated to focus on the
spatial relation if danger was present. This notion was largely inspired by Bransford,
Barcley and Franks’ (1972) study in that some of their materials included predatory
animals interacting with non-predatory animals in the sentence stimuli. Indeed, Jahn
(2004) found that participants’ sentence recognition was stronger for survival scenarios
as compared with non-survival scenarios. Perhaps serendipitously, this report
foreshadowed more recent efforts by Nairne and colleagues (Nairne et al., 2007; Nairne
et al., 2008), which showed that people are better at remembering words that are relevant
to survival scenarios, as compared with neutral scenarios.
While the present study is consistent with work by Radvansky and Copeland
(2000; Radvansky et al., 2003), in that functional spatial relations were read faster and
recognized better than nonfunctional spatial relations, they are inconsistent with ideas
from Jahn (2004) and Nairne et al. (2007). That is, survival content had little to no effect
on critical sentence reading time or memory for story content. Hence, as long as the
information conveys a functional relation, readers spontaneously construct situation
models for spatial relations while reading and do not appear to rely on additional causal
information (in this case, a dangerous scenario) specified in the narrative context in order
to do so. However, they may rely on elements of the story content to reconstruct their

55

situation model during recognition, but this stipulation does not diminish the implications
of the reading time outcomes observed for the present experiment.
Limitations and future directions
If human memory is specially tuned to survival relevant information (Nairne et
al., 2007; Nairne et al., 2008) then why was the present sample of readers as good at
recognizing functional sentences in a non-survival context as compared with functional
sentences read under survival contexts? Consider the characteristics of a typical adaptive
memory experiment: participants are told to imagine themselves as stranded in the
grasslands, rate a list of words on their relevancy to the scenario, and are then given a
surprise memory test for the words after completing a distracter task. First, whereas
previous adaptive memory studies (e.g., Nairne, et al., 2007) focused on the grasslands as
a setting, stories used in the present experiment described characters in a multitude of
environments and situations (e.g., a worker in a messy closet). Also, both survival and
non-survival situations were described in grasslands settings. It may be possible that there
is something special about the grassland environment that affects memory; this point may
require further examination. Second, in contrast to stimuli used by Jahn (2004),
immediate threats (such as an approaching hungry lion) were not specified for all of the
story stimuli used in the current study. In the present experiment some dangers could be
considered less imminent. For example, in the example story the worker in the messy
closet could have avoided the dripping poison by simply waiting, rather than using the
tarp. Thus, even though the stories in the current study were all rated as dangerous, there
might be a difference between general and immediate danger. Third, memory benefits
from survival scenarios may not have been observed in the current study because the
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survival scenario was set up by manipulating a single sentence in the story. It is possible
that this small manipulation was not strong enough to clearly convey the danger.
However, this possibility seems less likely because the stories were rated as clearly more
dangerous in the survival condition. Regardless, future research efforts may benefit from
lengthening the stories or adding additional sentences to emphasize the danger level of
the narratives.
Additional methodological distinctions between the current and typical adaptive
memory experiments also merit further consideration. For example, in contrast to the
typical second-person scenarios used in the adaptive memory studies (i.e., the word
“you” is used to refer to the participants themselves), stories in the present experiment
were written in the third-person (e.g., he or she). Hence, comparisons could be made for
second- vs. third-person perspective recognition (e.g., Copeland & Houska, 2010). Also,
recent evidence suggests that the future temporal perspective, in contrast to the past or
present, enhances survival-based memory (Klein, Robertson, & Denton, 2010). The
stories used in the current study were all framed in the past tense, or possibly interpreted
as the present tense; however, they clearly were not in a future perspective. It is possible
that stories written in future-oriented perspective may be more likely to show effects of
survival.
Conclusion
Comprehension of narrative discourse requires readers to generate situation
models of the state of affairs described in a text (Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk &
Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Situation models include representations of
protagonists, goals/intentionality, time, causation, and space (Zwann & Radvansky, 1998;
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Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 1995). Past research has shown that situation models for
functional spatial relations between characters and objects in the environment are more
easily processed and better remembered than nonfunctional spatial relationships
(Radvanksy & Copeland, 2000; Radvansky et al., 2003). The goal of the present
investigation was to determine if causality (as expressed in survival narrative scenarios)
is a necessary prerequisite for successful comprehension of functional spatial relations, as
suggested by Jahn (2004).
Consistent with the results obtained by Radvansky and Copeland (2000;
Radvansky et al., 2003), outcomes for the present study suggest that readers are better at
comprehending functional spatial relations as compared with nonfunctional spatial
relations. However, inconsistent with Jahn’s (2004) findings, danger/survival context did
not enhance memory for spatial relations. In fact, there was superior recall for
nonfunctional sentences that were associated with non-survival than survival context.
Along this line, at first glance, the results of the present study seem to be incompatible
with the adaptive memory hypothesis endorsed by Nairne and colleagues (Nairne et al.,
2007; Nairne et al., 2008), which poses that human memory is attuned to survivalrelevant information. However, while survival context did not enhance memory for the
spatial relations, a consideration of both the recognition and reading time results suggest
that people may have had good memories for the survival context itself.
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APPENDIX I
STORIES USED IN THE EXPERIMENT
Story 1
Earl was cleaning the old storage room at work.
It had not been cleaned in a long time.
The storage room was a huge mess.
There were boxes everywhere.
He could hardly walk around.
He saw an old pile of things up on a shelf that was over the doorway.
But he had difficulty reaching up to them.
Plus, there were a bunch of boxes in the way.
Critical survival sentence: As he reached, he knocked over a large jug of rat poison.
Critical non-survival sentence: As he reached, he knocked over a container of water.
It was dripping down right in the doorway - right where he needed to go.
Earl needed to find something to cover himself from the drips.
He spotted a plastic tarp he could use.
Critical functional sentence: Earl was holding the plastic tarp above him.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Earl was holding the plastic tarp next to him.
He was upset that he got stuck cleaning this storage room.
He thought that maybe he should ask for a raise.
Did Earl mop the floor?
Were there boxes in the storage room?
Story 2
Kim lay awake in her sleeping bag gazing at the stars.
She could never see this many stars back home in the city.
So far she had spotted over ten different constellations.
The most obvious was the big dipper.
The night was so clear that she could even spot Venus - it was the brightest object in the
sky.
She sighed as she relaxed in her sleeping bag - she had just purchased it for this trip.
The campfire she built a few hours ago was still burning.
It produced a lot of light and heat.
Critical survival sentence: Something bit her arm; she needed to sterilize the wound.
Critical non-survival sentence: Kim was feeling cold and saw she had goosebumps
on her arms.
She could hear the fire crackle.
She reached out and fumbled for the zipper on her sleeping bag.
She wiggled out of her sleeping bag and stood up.
Critical functional sentence: Kim moved and was standing next to the campfire.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Kim moved and was standing far from the
campfire.
She thought that she wasn't feeling too well.
Maybe this trip was a mistake.
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Did Kim look at Jupiter?
Had Kim eaten marshmallows?
Story 3
Ted couldn't believe his luck.
Last night it was rainy when he stumbled upon a small cave.
The cave was nice because it kept him dry all night.
Because it had stopped raining today, Ted spent the whole morning hiking.
In the afternoon, though, the sky became very dark.
It wasn't long before it began to rain.
Suddenly the rain started to come down really hard.
He could feel the wind stinging his face.
Critical survival sentence: Ted saw a tornado forming in the sky and was scared.
Critical non-survival sentence: Ted remembered that he had left his raingear in the
cave.
He could feel his clothes getting wetter as he weighed his options.
He quickly decided to retrace his steps and find the cave.
Luckily he remembered where it was.
Critical functional sentence: Ted was crouching quietly inside the cave.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Ted was crouching quietly outside the cave.
The rain continued for another hour.
By the time it stopped the sun was already setting.
Did Ted hike all morning?
Did the sky become dark in the morning?
Story 4
Izzie loved to go hunting on her family's farm.
She had been hunting with her dad for as long as she could remember.
Izzie shot her first gun when she was five years old.
Someone raised in the city might find that strange, but not out here in the country.
Since her dad died, though, Izzie would have to go hunting alone.
After taking some time to grieve, Izzie decided to get back out to the woods.
This month was deer season and Izzie had her favorite gun with her - she nicknamed it
Bandit.
While she was walking she came to abrupt stop.
Critical survival sentence: Izzie saw a large bobcat and had to protect herself.
Critical non-survival sentence: Izzie checked her gun and noticed she needed to
clean it.
She was standing out in the open.
She looked around for a better position.
She knelt down to steady herself.
Critical functional sentence: Izzie was holding her gun in front of her.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Izzie was holding her gun down at her side.
She knew that if she took care of her gun it would take care of her.
Her dad would be proud.
Was it deer season?
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Was Izzie 3 years old when she first shot a gun?
Story 5
Beth was hiking in the outback of Australia.
She loved the openness of the desert - it gave her a sense of freedom.
The scenery all around her was simply breathtaking.
She was a little bit upset that she had forgotten to bring her camera.
It didn't matter, though, because her mind was taking in a wonderful experience.
As she walked she saw a tree that had a giant beehive hanging from it.
She noticed a swarm of bees around the hive.
For some reason, she thought about her ninth grade science class when she learned bees
don't like water.
Critical survival sentence: Suddenly the swarm of bees came toward her and she
ran.
Critical non-survival sentence: Having not bathed for days, she wanted to soak in
water.
She looked around and saw a river.
It was about 100 yards away.
Beth moved straight toward it.
Critical functional sentence: Beth took a breath as she stood in the water.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Beth took a breath as she stood near the water.
The water was a greenish-brown color.
Luckily the current wasn't too strong.
Was Beth hiking in Africa?
Was the water blue?
Story 6
Rick was floating on a raft down the mighty Mississippi River.
He had just quit his job because of some crazy circumstances.
His annoying ex-wife was suing him for more child support.
Because Rick couldn't handle that stress, he decided to run away from his problems.
Although, in this case, he was floating away on his raft.
While it wasn't the best raft, so far he was moving along down the water.
As he drifted he took stock of his current situation.
He noticed some jagged rocks on the shore.
Critical survival sentence: Those jagged rocks on the shore would surely destroy his
raft.
Critical non-survival sentence: Rick gasped; he saw his ex-wife standing on the
jagged rocks.
Rick didn't want to be anywhere near those rocks.
The sun was starting to set over the trees in the distance.
He paddled furiously to move his raft.
Critical functional sentence: Rick's raft was floating far from the jagged rocks.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Rick's raft was floating close to the jagged rocks.
Rick wasn't sure what the future held for him.
He wasn't sure if he could ever go home again.
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Was Rick floating down the Amazon River?
Was Rick accused of assault?
Story 7
It was Saturday morning.
Erika had just finishing moving across country to California.
Nothing big was going on today so she slept in.
After hitting the snooze a few times she finally woke up.
The most important part of the day was getting some coffee.
As she headed for the kitchen she walked past her favorite picture - it was a portrait with
a large custom frame.
The giant frame weighed more than she did.
As she walked she noticed something strange.
Critical survival sentence: Earthquake - she needed to stand away from the heavy
frame!
Critical non-survival sentence: The frame seemed crooked; she should stand back
for a better view.
She took a deep breath and began to move.
She had just moved to California hoping things would go well.
This could be a bad omen.
Critical functional sentence: Erika was standing away from the frame.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Erika was standing right under the frame.
She was sad because she had just bought the house.
She was now regretting the move to California.
Had Erika moved to California?
Was the day Saturday?
Story 8
Tyler loved digging around in an old junkyard - it was one of his favorite pastimes.
His friends told him that vicious dogs sometimes guarded the place, but Tyler never saw
one.
The junkyard was filled with all sorts of stuff.
There was everything from stuffed animals to construction equipment.
But it was mostly filled with old beat up cars.
He could usually find something salvageable.
Today he needed to find a used part for his car.
He carefully searched for the small part.
Critical survival sentence: Tyler saw a big growling dog and had to find higher
ground.
Critical non-survival sentence: Tyler had to get a better view from someplace
higher.
He looked around to find something to help him out.
He noticed an old truck in the distance.
Without hesitating, he ran quickly towards the truck.
Critical functional sentence: Tyler was standing on top of the old truck.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Tyler was standing right next to the old truck.
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Just then he heard a loud crashing sound.
It was the owner - he must be returning from his lunch break.
Was Tyler looking for a used car part?
Did Tyler like the junkyard?
Story 9
Jason was traveling by himself in the arctic.
The place was so isolated that there was no one in sight.
All he could see was snow - everything was white.
It was so cold here in the arctic that all of the water was frozen over.
On the bright side, though, this made it easier to travel in straight paths.
Jason paused for a moment to rest.
He reached in his coat pocket for an energy bar.
Unfortunately, he didn't have any left.
Critical survival sentence: It was so cold, he needed to find shelter to survive.
Critical non-survival sentence: He wondered if anyone still lived in the igloos here.
He looked around him in every direction.
Jason saw an igloo on the horizon.
He quickly made his way to it.
Critical functional sentence: Jason was squatting inside of the igloo.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Jason was squatting outside of the igloo.
He was impressed by the small structure.
He was convinced, though, that he wouldn't want to live here.
Was the water in the arctic frozen?
Did Jason see a polar bear?
Story 10
Robert was hiking in a forest that was very dense with trees.
The smell of pine filled the air.
He was amazed at how tall the trees were.
Some of them had to be hundreds of feet tall.
He looked to the west and saw that the sun was beginning to set.
He turned around and couldn't see the path he had taken into the forest.
To the side, though, was a dark cave.
Robert decided to check it out and went inside the dark cave.
Critical survival sentence: As he explored, he heard a bear growling, and was
frightened.
Critical non-survival sentence: As he explored, it was getting late and getting
darker.
Robert knew he needed to get out of the cave immediately.
He scrambled back toward the entrance of the cave.
He stopped for a moment to catch his breath.
Critical functional sentence: Robert was standing just outside of the cave.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Robert was still standing inside of the cave.
He wanted his flashlight.
Unfortunately, he had forgotten to put it in his fanny pack.
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Was the sun setting?
Did Robert find his flashlight?
Story 11
Ivan was hiking in the jungle.
It was extremely humid this afternoon.
In fact, Ivan would go so far as to say that the air felt moist.
It was so humid that Ivan was dripping with sweat all over his body.
However, despite the weather, he was glad that he took this trip.
It allowed him to get away from his life, and to forget about his bitter divorce.
The real world seemed like it didn't matter anymore now that he was in the jungle.
He stopped for a moment to tie his shoelaces.
Critical survival sentence: Ivan turned and saw a rabid wolf foaming at the mouth.
Critical non-survival sentence: Ivan felt really hungry and wanted something to eat.
Ivan quickly stood up and rubbed his eyes.
There was a tall fruit tree in his periphery; the branches were far from the ground.
He jumped up, reaching for the branches.
Critical functional sentence: Ivan was crouching up in the tall fruit tree.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Ivan was crouching next to the tall fruit tree.
The tree was pretty sturdy.
It was filled with a whole bunch of ripe mangoes.
Did the air feel dry?
Was Ivan divorced?
Story 12
David walked along the banks of the river.
It had been raining for weeks so the river was full.
He really enjoyed the sound of the water.
He found it to be very peaceful.
He thought the view of the quiet river was amazing.
He decided to take some pictures with his new digital camera.
He wanted to capture the beauty of the river.
He scanned his surroundings looking for the perfect shot.
Critical survival sentence: From the corner of his eye he saw an alligator.
Critical non-survival sentence: From the corner of his eye he saw a tiny turtle.
He became very silent.
He didn't want to bring more attention to himself or startle it.
He started to slowly move away.
Critical functional sentence: David knelt down behind a very large rock.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: David knelt in front of a very large rock.
Except for shows on the Discovery Channel, he had never seen one of these before.
He couldn't wait to tell his friends when he got back home.
Did David take pictures with his cell phone?
Did David think the sound of the water was peaceful?
Story 13
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Jen was doing some yard work on the weekend.
It was the middle of September and the weather was beautiful.
She really would like to be swimming, but these chores needed to be done first.
She preferred to do everything in one weekend, so she could get it over with.
She didn't mind doing this though.
At least she didn't have to take care of the cars - her husband took care of those.
Earlier she had been using a ladder to clean the tall windows on her house.
Right now she was pulling weeds along the side of the house.
Critical survival sentence: Jen saw some poisonous black widow spiders on the
ground.
Critical non-survival sentence: Jen saw a really small cockroach scurrying across
the ground.
She didn't trust her eyes at first.
When she looked again she started to freak out.
She wanted to get as far off the ground as possible.
Critical functional sentence: Jen screamed while she was on top of the ladder.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Jen screamed while she was right next to the
ladder.
At that moment she closed her eyes.
She was trying to calm down by thinking of a happy place.
Was it September?
Was Jen's husband taking care of their cars?
Story 14
Paul had been in Afghanistan for six months.
This was his second tour overseas.
Paul was relieved that so far he hadn't seen any real combat.
Today they were doing a routine patrol in their tank.
After a couple of hours the guys were bored and hot.
They stepped out of the tank to cool off and take a break.
Some of the guys lit up cigarettes.
Just then Paul spotted some people who appeared on the side of the road.
Critical survival sentence: It was an ambush and the enemy started shooting.
Critical non-survival sentence: Another unit needed to be towed behind Paul's tank.
Paul yelled to his unit as he started to move.
They all acknowledged his yell right away.
A couple of the guys followed Paul.
Critical functional sentence: Paul was standing right behind the armored tank.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Paul was standing in front of the armored tank.
He realized that he had dropped his gloves.
He paused for a moment while he pondered whether it was worth it to go get them.
Did the soldiers light up cigarettes?
Did Paul drop his gloves?
Story 15
Mark began every morning with a brisk five mile jog.
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Although it was chillier outside than usual, he did not mind.
He preferred the cool air instead of the brutal summer heat.
If he kept a solid pace, Mark might get back in time for breakfast before work.
He had almost completed his fourth mile when he turned on Main Street.
The stores were just beginning to open.
He waved at a friend sitting across the street at a café.
Mark turned and started to walk across an intersection.
Critical survival sentence: A speeding car headed toward him in the intersection.
Critical non-survival sentence: A skateboarder headed toward him in the
intersection.
Mark looked up at the crossing signal.
The walk signal was still flashing.
He rushed to get across the intersection.
Critical functional sentence: Mark walked and had made it across the crosswalk.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Mark walked and was halfway across the
crosswalk.
Suddenly Mark began heaving, unable to catch his breath.
He clutched at his heart and hoped that this wasn't the end of the line.
Did Mark usually bike in the mornings?
Was it really hot outside?
Story 16
Kathy loves being outdoors and is always up for adventure.
Every month she comes up with something new to try.
This month she decided to go rock climbing at the Grand Canyon.
She chose the Grand Canyon because of the breathtaking views.
Plus she had never had a chance to come to the Grand Canyon.
She had been rock climbing before, but this time she was alone.
She knew it was risky but that made it even more exciting.
As she climbed up the rocks, she surveyed her position.
Critical survival sentence: Just then, the rope came untied and she had to save
herself.
Critical non-survival sentence: She was happy because she was close to reaching the
top.
Her adrenaline was rushing.
It took all of her energy but she held on tightly to the rope.
She knew all she had to do was grab the next rock.
Critical functional sentence: She was able to reach the rock above her.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: She was far away from the rock above her.
It was an adventure she would never forget.
She couldn't wait to see what her next challenge would be.
Was Kathy at Red Rock?
Was Kathy mountain biking?
Story 17
Today was day three.
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Every year Dan liked to get away to the woods with his wife.
This year was no exception.
They loved to spend a week in the summer, away from the heat back home.
The temperature was at least twenty degrees cooler here.
Plus, it was nice to get away from their email and phones for a while.
Right now his wife was out looking at birds.
Meanwhile Dan stayed back at the camp because he wanted something to eat.
Critical survival sentence: Dan saw a cobra emerge that looked like it might attack.
Critical non-survival sentence: Dan was hungry and wanted to eat the steak that he
cooked.
Dan quickly looked around.
He needed to find his bowie knife.
Thankfully he found it quickly and picked it up.
Critical functional sentence: Dan held his bowie knife out in front of him.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Dan held his bowie knife down along his side.
He was glad that he brought his knife with him.
If it wasn't for his wife, he would have forgotten to bring it.
Was it cooler in the woods?
Was Dan's wife looking at birds?
Story 18
It was Jim's twenty-fifth birthday.
He woke up eager to celebrate.
Unfortunately, he had to go to work that day.
When he got to his office, he went to the top floor to say good morning to his friend, Dot.
Dot wished him a happy birthday and gave him a plate of cookies.
She had made the cookies from scratch just for him.
Dot told Jim that they were chocolate chip cookies.
Jim grabbed one and took a really big bite.
Critical survival sentence: Suddenly Jim's throat began to tighten; he was choking.
Critical non-survival sentence: Jim wanted to thank Dot, but his mouth was full of
cookie.
He stopped chewing and tried to swallow.
His throat felt dry and scratchy -– he needed to drink some water.
He walked around and saw a drinking fountain.
Critical functional sentence: The drinking fountain was right in front of him.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: The drinking fountain was down the hall from him.
Jim began to cough.
Dot thought that Jim was disgusting and gross.
Was it Jim's fortieth birthday?
Did Dot make brownies for Jim?
Story 19
Every summer Chip visited his uncle on the family ranch.
His uncle always made him work hard.
He said that a boy like Chip would do good if he developed a good work ethic.

67

Chip thought that his uncle was old fashioned.
He'd rather be back at the house playing PS3 instead.
But, he knew his uncle wouldn't let him have dinner unless he finished the chores.
Today Chip was cleaning up and inspecting the fence and gate around the cattle.
Chip didn't care for this because the cattle could sometimes act unpredictably.
Critical survival sentence: Suddenly there was a stampede - he had to get up high.
Critical non-survival sentence: The top of the gate was dirty and needed to be
cleaned.
Chip wanted to move quickly.
There was barbed wire along the fence, but none on the gate.
The gate was very tall - at least two feet higher than the fence.
Critical functional sentence: Chip climbed up so he was on top of the gate.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Chip moved so that he was right next to the gate.
The cattle were very loud and aggressive.
Chip hated working on this ranch.
Did Chip's uncle make him work hard?
Did Chip like working at the ranch?
Story 20
Tim was at the zoo.
It was his favorite place to go on his days off from work.
Today was a beautiful day.
Some of the animals were out sunning themselves.
Tim walked towards the lion’s den.
While one lion was out in the open eating its food it looked up and growled at him.
Tim wanted to see what the lion was eating.
He leaned over the railing to get a better look.
Critical survival sentence: Tim lost his balance and fell in near the hungry lion.
Critical non-survival sentence: He saw that the lion was eating a piece of raw meat.
A wave of nausea swept over Tim.
He knew that he needed to get out of there.
He saw an exit sign.
Critical functional sentence: Tim was standing right next to the main exit.
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Tim was standing far away from the exit.
His face was dripping with sweat.
This was not a good day.
Were the animals swimming?
Did a lion growl?
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APPENDIX II
RECOGNITION ITEMS
Story 1
Earl was holding the plastic tarp above him.
Earl was holding the plastic tarp next to him.
Earl was holding the newspaper above him.
Earl was holding the newspaper next to him.
Story 2
Kim moved and was standing next to the campfire.
Kim moved and was standing far from the campfire.
Kim moved and was standing next to the backpack.
Kim moved and was standing far from the backpack.
Story 3
Ted was crouching quietly inside the cave.
Ted was crouching quietly outside the cave.
Ted was crouching quietly inside the boat.
Ted was crouching quietly outside the boat.
Story 4
Izzie was holding her gun in front of her.
Izzie was holding her gun down at her side.
Izzie was holding her compass in front of her.
Izzie was holding her compass down at her side.
Story 5
Beth took a breath as she stood in the water.
Beth took a breath as she stood near the water.
Beth took a breath as she stood in the leaves.
Beth took a breath as she stood near the leaves.
Story 6
Rick's raft was floating far from the jagged rocks.
Rick's raft was floating close to the jagged rocks.
Rick's raft was floating far from the waterfall.
Rick's raft was floating close to the waterfall.
Story 7
Erika was standing away from the frame.
Erika was standing right under the frame
Erika was standing away from the clock.
Erika was standing right under the clock.
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Story 8
Tyler was standing on top of the old truck.
Tyler was standing right next to the old truck.
Tyler was standing on top of the old stove.
Tyler was standing right next to the old stove.
Story 9
Jason was squatting inside of the igloo.
Jason was squatting outside of the igloo.
Jason was squatting inside of the snow bank.
Jason was squatting outside of the snow bank.
Story 10
Robert was standing just outside of the cave.
Robert was still standing inside of the cave.
Robert was standing just outside of the lodge.
Robert was still standing inside of the lodge.
Story 11
Ivan was crouching up in the tall fruit tree.
Ivan was crouching next to the tall fruit tree.
Ivan was standing up in the dense weeds.
Ivan was standing next to the dense weeds.
Story 12
David knelt down behind a very large rock.
David knelt in front of a very large rock.
David knelt down behind a very large tree stump.
David knelt in front of a very large tree stump.
Story 13
Jen screamed while she was on top of the ladder.
Jen screamed while she was right next to the ladder.
Jen screamed while she was on top of the table.
Jen screamed while she was right next to the table.
Story 14
Paul was standing right behind the armored tank.
Paul was standing in front of the armored tank.
Paul was standing right behind the old jeep.
Paul was standing in front of the old jeep.
Story 15
Mark walked and had made it across the crosswalk.
Mark walked and was halfway across the crosswalk.
Mark walked and had made it across the bridge.
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Mark walked and was halfway across the bridge.
Story 16
She was able to reach the rock above her.
She was far away from the rock above her.
She was able to reach the tree branch above her.
She was far away from the tree branch above her.
Story 17
Dan held his bowie knife out in front of him.
Dan held his bowie knife down along his side.
Dan held his fishing rod out in front of him.
Dan held his fishing rod down along his side.
Story 18
The drinking fountain was right in front of him.
The drinking fountain was down the hall from him.
The copy machine was right in front of him.
The copy machine was down the hall from him.
Story 19
Chip climbed up so he was on top of the gate.
Chip moved so that he was right next to the gate.
Chip climbed up so he was on top of the horse.
Chip moved so that he was right next to the horse.
Story 20
Tim was standing right next to the main exit.
Tim was standing far away from the exit.
Tim was standing right next to the zoo gift shop.
Tim was standing far away from the gift shop.
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APPENDIX III

RT (msecs)

PREDICTED READING TIME OUTCOMES

Functional
Nonfunctional

Survival

Non-survival

Figure 1. Possible reading time outcome where effects of survival and functionality are
additive.
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RT (msecs)

Functional
Nonfunctional

Survival

Non-survival

Figure 2. Possible reading time outcome where reading times are faster if sentences are

RT (msecs)

either survival or functional (or both).

Functional
Nonfunctional

Survival

Non-survival

Figure 3. Possible reading time outcome if survival drives the functionality effect.
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RT (msecs)

Functional
Nonfunctional

Survival

Non-survival

Figure 4. Possible reading time outcome where reading times are faster if sentences are
functional.
.
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APPENDIX IV

% Correctly Recognized

PREDICTED RECOGNITION OUTCOMES

Functional
Nonfunctional

Survival

Non-survival

Figure 5. Possible accuracy outcome if effects of survival and functionality are additive.
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% Correctly Recognized

Functional
Nonfunctional

Survival

Non-survival

Figure 6. Possible accuracy outcome if high accuracy requires situation to either be

% Correctly Recognized

survival or functional (or both).

Functional
Nonfunctional

Survival

Non-survival

Figure 7. Possible accuracy outcome if Survival drives the Functionality effect.
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% Correctly Recognized

Functional
Nonfunctional

Survival

Non-survival

Figure 8. Possible accuracy outcome if high accuracy requires situation to be functional
only.
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APPENDIX V
STORY ACCEPTABILITY JUDGMENTS

Table 1. Story readability judgements.

Story condition
Survival-functional
Survival-nonfunctional
Non-survival-functional
Non-survival-nonfunctional

M
5.34
5.19
5.24
5.15
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SE
.08
.10
.11
.08

Table 2. Means and standard errors for the critical spatial relations sentence acceptability
judgments and ratings.

Sentence as possible fit (yes/no)
Surv
Non-surv
Functional
9.50 (.40) 9.40 (.31)
Nonfunctional 9.30 ( .21) 9.20 (.33)
Distracter
4.60 (.73) 4.30 (.78)

Sentence fit ratings
Surv
Non-surv
6.03 (.33) 5.98 (.23)
4.76 (.27) 5.14 (.27)
2.11 (.09) 2.12 (.21)
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Table 3. Sentence acceptability judgments.

Comparison
Non-survival-functional vs. survival-functional
Survival-nonfunctional vs. survival-functional
Non-survival-nonfunctional vs. survival-functional
Survival-nonfunctional vs. non-survival-nonfunctional
Non-survival-nonfunctional vs. non-survival-functional
Non-survival-nonfunctional vs. survival-nonfunctional
Distracter 1 vs. survival-functional
Distracter 1vs. non-survival-functional
Distracter 1 vs. survival-nonfunctional
Distracter 1 vs. non-survival-nonfunctional
Distracter 2 vs. survival-functional
Distracter 2 vs. non-survival-functional
Distracter 2 vs. survival-non-functional
Distracter 2 vs. non-survival-nonfunctional
Distracter 2 vs. distracter 1
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Wilcoxon signed
ranks test (Z)
-.45
-.69
-1.00
-.33
-1.00
-.33
-2.68
-2.67
-2.68
-2.67
-2.68
-2.67
-2.67
-2.69
-7.82

p
.66
.49
.32
.74
.32
.74
.007
.008
.007
.008
.007
.008
.008
.007
.43

APPENDIX VI
RECOGNITION OUTCOME TABLE

Table 4. Means and standard errors for recognition scores.

Functional
Nonfunctional

Survival

Non-survival

.80 (.24)
.66 (.25)

.82 (.23)
.75 (.23)
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APPENDIX VII
RECOGNITION OUTCOME FIGURES

% correctly recognized

0.90
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
Functional

Nonfunctional

Figure 9. Effect of functionality on recognition scores.
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% correctly recognized

0.90
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
Survival

Non-survival

Figure 10. Effect of survival on recognition scores.

% correctly recognized

0.90
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
Functional

0.40

Nonfuntional

0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
Survival

Non-survival

Figure 11. Interactive effects of functionality and survival on recognition scores.
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APPENDIX VIII
READING TIME TABLE

Table 5. Means and standard errors for critical sentence reading times.

Functional
Nonfunctional

Survival

Non-survival

2085.02 (753.50)
2369.99 (960.31)

2209.44 (721.60)
2182.44 (701.07)
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APPENDIX IX
READING TIME OUTCOME FIGURES

3000.00

RT (msecs)

2500.00
2000.00
1500.00
1000.00
500.00
0.00
Functional

Nonfunctional

Figure 12. Effect of functionality on critical sentence reading times.
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2500.00
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2000.00
1500.00
1000.00
500.00
0.00
Survival

Non-survival

Figure 13. Effect of survival on critical sentence reading times.
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2500.00
2000.00
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Figure 14. Interactive effects of functionality and survival on critical sentence reading
times.
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